企业职工基本养老保险制度中的缺陷及对策——养老保险资金筹集中的博弈困境及对策

【作者】 田松青；

【导师】 刘雄；

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 劳动经济， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 目前，我国统帐结合的部分积累制的城镇企业职工基本养老保险制度，在具体的实施过程中暴露出一系列的问题：企业逃、避费现象严重，“个人帐户”空帐规模越来越大，政府财政被动补偿养老金欠帐等，这些问题使现行制度因资金短缺而面临着严重的支付危机。 我们知道，趋利避害是理性人的基本特征，但理性的企业和政府应该是在现行制度和法律所容许的范围内最大限度地谋求他的利益。企业和政府的行为和作用，也最终由现行制度的规范程度所决定的。因此，目前企业和政府行为不规范现象的根源不在企业和政府本身，而在于制度本身存在着缺陷。 笔者试图运用博弈论的基本理论，分析新制度建立过程中，政府和企业、企业和企业在供款问题上的策略选择，从而找出导致现行制度因资金短缺而面临支付危机的制度原因，并提出相应的解决措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 Now, in our country The main system of the old age insurance for city enterprise employees is "partially-funded system". This system has exposed many defects. The main problems are reflected in the follow there aspects: (1) Many enterprises evade old age insurance contribution which makes it hard to collect the contributions, and ever harder to expand the coverage. (2) The individual account is emptied, so there exist a potential danger for the abortion of the new system. (3) Because the revenue is insufficient to cover expenditure, state is forced to make up the funded deficiency. All these problems make the funded is facing financial crisis with a tendency to worsening.Seeking advantage and evading disadvantage is the reasoning being’s basic characteristic, but reasoning enterprises and state should try their best to seek their interest within the limits of system and law. And the system and law decided the behavior and function of the enterprise and state. Why do the reasoning enterprise and state take inreasoning behavior, I think the reason doesn’t exist enterprise and state themselves, but exist the system itself.Using the basic theory of game theory, I analyzed the games about providing fund for the establishing of the "partially-funded system", that occur between state and enterprise, and between enterprise and enterprise. So that I can find the reasons that make the system faces financial crisis with a tendency to worsening, and put forward countermeasures accordingly.更多还原