【作者】 陈娴；

【导师】 邓宏兵；

【作者基本信息】 华中师范大学 ， 区域经济学， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 中国国有企业改革22年来取得了巨大进步，但问题也很突出。单纯的扩权让利、承包经营以及试行中的公司制改造的思路实际上都没有真正涉及到企业的产权制度变革、企业法人治理结构的建立、公平竞争市场环境的构筑、以及国有产权权益保障等问题。这些在现阶段国企改革中绕不开的关节点最终导致了研究重点从外部性政策调整向根本性制度创新的转变。本文的研究立足投资环境(主要是制度环境)的角度来分析国有企业的发展问题，而改善国有企业投资环境的目的是为了保护国有资产权益，抑制内部人机会主义行为，维护中小股东及企业员工的切身利益，促进国有企业的健康发展。本文共分五个部分： 第一部分为绪论。简要阐述了研究背景、研究现状、研究思路与方法及研究前提，包括中国国有企业发展的历史沿革、改革进程及国有企业等相关概念的界定。本文运用的理论基础包括三方面内容，一是新制度学派对“制度”概念的诠释；二是现代企业理论中关于产权、委托-代理关系与代理问题、公司治理结构及资本结构等内容的研究成果；三是投资环境研究的最新成果，为国有企业投资环境研究提供了研究框架。 第二部分为中外国有企业投资环境的比较分析。主要有三个方面的不同，一是国有企业建立时期的经济发展状况不同；二是遵循的理论依据不同；三是采取的组织制度形式与国家管理、控制国企的体制方式不同。总之，市场经济国家中的国企是在特定领域中存在的特殊企业，而我国的国企则是作为一般企业而存在。 第三部分为中国国有企业投资环境的发展与演变分析。在分析了传统国企投资环境要素和改革过程中国企外部经济环境的变化后，重点剖析了国有企业在改革进程中呈现的四大制度性问题，一是国有制下不能解决政企不分；二是国家所有权约束无效；三是内部人控制问题严重；四是资本结构有缺陷，国有债权软约束。 第四部分为中国国有企业投资环境的优化对策分析。指出改善国企的内外环境需要全方位出击，主线是企业产权制度改革、建立有效的公司治理结构与创造公平的市场竞争环境“三驾马车”并架齐驱。为此需要对国企进行分类改 ＃＼硕士学住论文 V烦，旮kuSIR’引mSIS 造，在理顺国有资产归属关系的基础上，特殊国企可以保持原有的经营模式， 大量一般国企可选择走民营化道路；企业治理方面选用共同治理模式，健全经 营者激励机制、内部监控机制、外部市场约束机制与法律约束机制，并且结合 经济伦理道德秩序建设与企业文化建设，共同创造适合国有企业生存发展的内 外投资环境。 第五部分为结语。更多还原

【Abstract】 The China’s state-owned enterprises (short for SOES) reform has achieved great progress since 1978, but its problem is also outstanding. The thinking of reform measures, such as mere power extending and interest reducing, contracting out system and the share-holding system on a trial basis, in fact does not involve following problems: the change of property rights system , the establishment of company governance , the constructing of fairly competitive market environment and the interests protection of state-owned property rights , which results in transforming the research emphasis from external policy regulation to essential institutional innovation . This paper analyses the advancement problems of SOES from the angle of investment climate (mainly in the institution climate). The aim of improving SOES’ investment climate is to protect the rights and interests of state capital, restrain managers’ opportunist behavior and assert rights of the small shareholders and staffs , thus accelerate SOES’ wholesome development. This paper consists five parts.This first part is the introduction. It briefly interprets the research background, present research situation, main thinking and methods, as well as the research prerequisite that contains the historical development and reform processes of SOES, and the limitation of relative conceptions. The fundamental theories are as follows: (l)the annotations to "Institution" in the New Institution Economics; (2)the research achievements about property rights , principal-agent relation , agent problem , corporate governance and capital structure in the modern firm theory; (3)the last achievements in the investment climate study, which provide a flame to the SOES investment climate study.The second part deals with the comparison of SOES between China and western countries. The difference is in three aspects: (1) the financial condition in SOES’ founding period ; (2)the according theory ; (3)the firm system and the control mechanism by government. In conclusion, SOES’ are special firms in western countries, while are common ones in China.inThe third part deals with the analysis to the investment climate development of China’s SOES. After analyzing the traditional SOBS’ investment climate elements and changes of economic climate in reform processes, four institutional problem are put emphasis on. (1)A mixture of government administration and enterprise management is impossible under state-ownership; (2)The state ownership control is invalid; (3) The insider control problem is serious ; (4)The capital structure has defects and the state-owned creditor’s rights is in soft control.The fourth part makes improvement countermeasures to the China’ SOES investment climate. It points out that three aspects should be carried out together, which consists of the property rights system reform, valid company governance and creating fairly competitive market environment. For that, the specific measures are as follows: (l)SOES should be classified to reform. On the basis of rationalizing the state-owned capital’s belongingness relation, the special SOES could maintain original operating pattern, and most common SOES could chose the non-nationalization way; (2)Choose the joint governance modal to construct a investment climate fit for SOES’ development by perfecting the inspiring mechanism for managers , internal monitor mode , external market control and law control mechanism, combining with the economic ethics and the company culture building .The last part is the conclusion.更多还原