【摘要】 利用中国第七次全国人口普查的人口寿命数据，构建寿险精算模型考察城镇职工个人账户养老基金保障效果与支付能力的双目标决策。研究表明，由于账户余额继承规定与计发月数滞后于人口寿命增长，现行个人账户方案产生了对养老金延迟领取的“过度激励”与养老金资源的“继承性流失”，造成金额巨大的个人账户兜底支付负担。对于个人账户的养老金保障水平与基金支付能力，现有参量改革办法：延长退休年龄、提高计发月数与调整记账利率及其组合方式，无法实现“鱼和熊掌”二者兼得。建议为职工建立起国家财政托底的、可供选择的长寿保险领取方式，优化养老金领取年龄规定，实现个人账户基金保障效果与支付能力双重决策目标的帕累托优化。更多还原

【Abstract】 By exploiting the life expectancy data of China’s “Seventh National Population Census”, this study has constructed a life insurance actuarial model to examine the dual decision-making goals of the security effect and payment capacity of urban employees’ personal account funds. Research has shown that due to the regulations on inheritance of account balances and the lag in the setting of payment monthly divisors compared to the aging population, the current personal pension account scheme creates an “excessive incentive” for delaying the receipt of pension and an “inheritable loss” of pension resources, resulting in a huge burden of personal account guaranteed payment. The existing parameter reform methods for the pension security level and fund payment capacity of personal accounts, such as delaying retirement age, increasing the monthly divisors of payment and the accounting interest rates, and their combination, cannot achieve both “fish and bear’s paw”. It is advisable to establish a longevity insurance payment method for employees that is supported by national finance and available for selection, and to optimize the pension age regulations, in order to achieve Pareto improvement of the dual decision-making goals of personal account security effect and payment capacity.更多还原