【摘要】 针对传统单一博弈模型难以解决电力市场多主体利益冲突与源荷不确定性问题，提出一种配电网运营商-虚拟电厂-产消者联盟多主体分层决策框架。首先，构建基于双Stackelberg-Nash混合博弈的三层能量交易架构：上层决策以配电网运营商收益最大化为核心目标，中层博弈引导虚拟电厂实现效益优化，下层通过产消者联盟协同降低用电成本。其次，引入纳什谈判理论，将产消者间的合作博弈解耦为两阶段优化问题，形成兼顾个体理性与集体效率的混合博弈优化模型。然后，基于KKT条件与McCormick包络法，将模型转化为双层混合整数线性规划问题，并结合Kriging元模型优化算法实现高效求解。最后，仿真结果表明，所提策略在提升系统主体收益、降低用电成本依赖性及增强风险应对能力方面具有显著优势。更多还原

【Abstract】 Traditional single-game models face challenges in resolving multi-agent interest conflicts and addressing source-load uncertainties in electricity markets. To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes a multi-agent hierarchical decision-making framework involving distribution system operators(DSOs), virtual power plants(VPPs), and prosumers coalitions. First, a three-level energy trading architecture based on a Stackelberg-Nash hybrid game is developed: The upper-level decision-making layer focuses on maximizing DSO’s operational revenue, the middle-level game layer guides the VPPs to achieve economic efficiency optimization, and the lower-level cooperation layer enables prosumer coalitions to collaboratively reduce electricity consumption costs. By introducing Nash bargaining theory, the cooperative game among prosumers is decoupled into a two-stage optimization problem, thereby establishing a hybrid game optimization model that simultaneously considers individual rationality and collective efficiency. Through the KKT conditions and McCormick envelope methods, the model is transformed into a bilevel mixed-integer linear programming(MILP) problem, which is then efficiently solved using a Kriging metamodel optimization algorithm. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed strategy exhibits significant advantages in enhancing the economic benefits of all participating entities, reducing dependence on electricity consumption costs, and strengthening the system’s risk resilience capability.更多还原