【摘要】 两汉选举盛行推荐，荐者与被荐者结下“私”的恩义关系以扩张势力。东汉皇帝作为公权力的化身不便私下结交或随意任命士人，故难以与臣下建立“私”的关系，有沦为认可程序的危险。贵戚与皇帝有“私”的亲属关系故支持作为个体的皇帝，皇帝利用贵戚代替自己与儒生交结，在维持自身公权力合法性的同时又能间接与儒生缔结“私”的关系。为抑制贵戚扩张自身势力，皇帝积极掌握儒林舆论以鉴定被推荐的儒生名声的虚实，并使得贵戚之间相互竞争。贵戚力求通过交结、推荐名儒以合法化自身权力并获得官位。名儒可以不再依赖私下请托而是依恃名声与达官贵戚交结，从而获得推荐，将儒林中的名声转化为官位。由于皇帝角色的结构性缺失，这一围绕“名声”运作的新选举路线在和帝以后崩溃。更多还原

【Abstract】 During the Western and Eastern Han periods, official selection relied mainly on recommendation, through which recommenders and nominees formed private bonds to expand influence.As the embodiment of public authority, the Eastern Han emperors were in no position to associate with Confucian scholars in private or appoint them optionally, making it difficult to form such bonds with subordinates and having the risk of being reduced to a merely approving role.The royal relatives supported the emperor due to their private kinship ties, while the emperor used the royal relatives to engage with Confucian scholars on his behalf.In this way the emperor built indirect and private ties with Confucian scholars and at the same time preserved his legitimacy as the embodiment of public authority.To curb the expansion of royal relatives’ power, the emperor monitored opinions within Confucian circles to assess the recommended scholars’ reputations, and fostered competitions among royal relatives.Royal relatives sought to legitimize their authority and secure official positions by associating with and recommending eminent Confucian scholars.Confucian scholars could rely on their reputation rather than private solicitation to form ties with high officials and royal relatives, obtain recommendations from them, and then convert fame in the Confucian circles into official positions.Owing to the structural absence of the imperial role, this reputation-based official selection route collapsed after the reign of Emperor He.更多还原