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高管非正常离职对审计费用的影响机制研究

Research on the Mechanism of the Impact of Senior Executives’ Abnormal Turnover on Audit Fees

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【作者】 郭雪萌孔令鹏郑涵中

【Author】 Guo Xuemeng;Kong Lingpeng;Zheng Hanzhong;

【通讯作者】 孔令鹏;

【机构】 北京交通大学经济管理学院

【摘要】 近年来我国上市公司高管非正常离职频发,呈现出模糊性与突发性的特征,其背后蕴含着复杂的信息。本文以2008—2024年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管非正常离职与审计费用之间的关系。研究发现,高管非正常离职能够显著提高审计费用。机制检验发现,高管非正常离职通过提高企业经营风险、增加企业违规行为、提高社会关注度,增加审计投入,从而提高审计费用。进一步分析发现总经理非正常离职对审计费用的影响更大。异质性分析表明,该影响在非国有企业、内部控制存在缺陷、机构投资者持股比例低、审计师不具备行业专长的分组中更显著。本研究将高管非正常离职经济后果拓展至审计师这一外部利益相关者,有助于审计师和监管部门更好地应对高管非正常离职现象。

【Abstract】 In recent years, abnormal turnover of senior executives of listed companies in China has occurred frequently. Such abnormal departure, featuring suddenness and uncertainty, contains complex information. This paper takes listed companies of Chinese A-share market from 2008 to 2024 as the research sample and empirically examines the relationship between the senior executives abnormal departure and audit fees. Findings indicate that senior executives abnormal departure will significantly increase the audit fees. Mechanism tests show that the senior executives abnormal departure increases audit fees by increasing the operational risks, corporate violations, social attention and audit effort. Further analysis reveals that the abnormal depature of the general manager has a more significant impact on audit fees. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that the senior executives abnormal departure has a more significant impact on audit fees in the groups of non-state-owned enterprises with internal control weakness, low shareholding ratio of institutional investors, and whose auditors lack industry expertise. This study extends the economic consequences of senior executives abnormal departure to external stakeholders such as auditors, which can help auditors and regulatory authorities better deal with the abnormal departure of senior executives.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号:72472010、72272010)的资助
  • 【分类号】F832.51;F239.4;F272.91
  • 【下载频次】472
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