【摘要】 宏观审慎政策国际协调是高水平开放进程中有效维护金融稳定、妥善化解外部遏制的重要抓手。本文从理论层面分析宏观审慎政策国际协调对金融稳定的影响机制，并考察宏观审慎政策国际协调的动态演变特征以及内外部宏观审慎政策协调对中国金融稳定的非线性影响。研究发现：在博弈过程中，两国宏观金融环境差异使非合作更易成为宏观审慎政策国际协调的主要形式；中国宏观审慎政策与其他国家宏观审慎政策的协调动态表现出非同步性和非对称性特征，且与新兴市场国家的政策协调水平更高；在金融稳定状况处于较低分位数时，与发达国家的宏观审慎政策协调能够增强中国金融体系的冲击抵御能力，而在金融稳定状况相对较好时，与新兴市场国家开展政策协调更有助于提升中国金融稳定。更多还原

【Abstract】 The international coordination of macroprudential policies serves as a crucial instrument for effectively safeguarding financial stability and appropriately mitigating external containment amidst advancing financial integration and liberalisation. Although the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements(BIS) have consistently urged countries in recent years to coordinate their use of macroprudential policies to uphold the global capital order and financial stability, regulatory authorities, anchored by domestic financial stability objectives, frequently exhibit a preference for independent prudential management. This tendency has resulted in a prolonged deficiency in discussions concerning the macroprudential dimension within the design of international coordination mechanisms. Against the backdrop of a century-defining transformation, the checks, balances and rivalry among various national macroprudential policies are growing increasingly complex. The spillover of macroprudential policies from developed countries, which is characterised by risk transference and regulatory arbitrage, has once again laid bare the latent hegemonic features within international coordination processes. Consequently, the majority of emerging market countries are left to passively absorb coordination outcomes predominantly shaped by developed countries. There is thus a pressing need for the international community to establish a timely and effective framework for such coordination that gives full consideration to the interests of numerous emerging markets, with China as a prominent representative.To investigate this critical gap, this paper first constructs a two-country macroprudential policy game model incorporating an exogenous shock parameter to analyse the impact mechanism of international macroprudential policy coordination on financial stability. It subsequently employs a conditional dynamic spillover index framework and a “semi-structured” data combination strategy to identify the dynamic evolution of this coordination. Finally, building upon a mixed-frequency measurement of the financial stability index, it examines the non-linear effects of macroprudential policy coordination on China’s financial stability.The analysis yields three principal findings. First, a relationship of strategic substitutes exists between the two countries’ macroprudential policies. Although regulatory cooperation under homogeneous conditions is more conducive to safeguarding financial stability, the fundamental disparities in their macro-financial environments render non-cooperation the more likely predominant form of international coordination. Second, international macroprudential policy coordination is closely associated with major global economic and financial events. The coordination of China’s macroprudential policies with other countries demonstrates characteristics of asynchronicity and asymmetry, and the level of policy coordination with emerging market countries is higher. Third, when China’s financial stability is at a lower quantile, coordination with developed countries enhances the shock resilience of its financial system. Conversely, when financial stability is relatively robust, coordination with emerging market countries is more effective in promoting it. Collectively, this research confirms the necessity of a systematic analysis of the financial stability effects arising from international macroprudential policy coordination and yields insights for how China might enhance the efficacy and sustainability of its regulatory targeting and policy stance adjustments within such international coordination frameworks.更多还原