【摘要】 弗雷格最为关注的是如何从逻辑学和哲学的意义上解决知识的确定性和客观性问题。如果说《概念文字：一种模仿算术语言构造的纯思维的形式语言》是知识的逻辑证明，《思想：一种逻辑研究》就是知识的哲学论证。大体而言，通过原初语境分析可辨明，弗雷格“思想”含有三重知识论意蕴：（1）反心理主义原则。从语言出发，区分语言与逻辑、表象与思想，通过建构逻辑知识系统把心理的和经验的因素从逻辑分析中驱逐出去。（2）客观性原则。“思想”是句子的涵义，它属于“第三域”。相较于本体论或认识论的解读，“第三域”实质上是出于一种知识论立场。（3）自明性原则。弗雷格演算系统中的初始思想既具有逻辑自明性，又具有认知自明性。思想之“真”具有基始性，无法被定义。更多还原

【Abstract】 Gottlob Frege’s primary focus was on addressing the issues of the certainty and objectivity of knowledge from both logical and philosophical perspectives. If “Begriffsschrift” represents the logical demonstration of knowledge, then “ Thought ” embodies the philosophical justification of knowledge. Generally speaking, through the analysis of the original context, it can be discerned that Frege’s “thought” encompasses three epistemological implications:(1) the principle of anti-psychologism. Starting from natural language, Frege distinguishes between language and logic, thought and idea, and constructs a logical knowledge system to expel psychological and empirical factors from logical analysis.(2) The principle of objectivity. “Thought” is the meaning of a sentence, which belongs to the “third realm”. Compared to ontological or epistemic interpretations, the “third realm” essentially stems from a theory of knowledge.(3) The principle of self-evidence. The initial thoughts in Frege’s calculus system possess both logical self-evidence and cognitive self-evidence. Therefore, the “true” of a thought is foundational and cannot be defined.更多还原