【摘要】 以《地方金融条例》和《地方金融监督管理条例》的颁布实施为准自然实验，采用多期双重差分模型，实证分析地方金融监管权力法治化对企业资本收入份额的影响效应。研究结果表明，地方金融监管权力法治化显著降低了企业资本要素的收入份额。机制检验发现，其主要通过限制影子银行活动和抑制杠杆操纵行为得以实现。异质性分析揭示，该政策对资本收入份额的调控效应在企业关联方开展地方金融业务活动、地区监管政策自主性较高、地区监管力度较强及地方政府隐性债务规模较小的情况下更为显著。研究为深化地方金融监管法治建设与优化要素收入分配结构提供了理论依据与政策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper treats the enactment of the "Local Financial Regulation" and the "Local Financial Supervision and Administration Regulation" as a quasi-natural experiment and employs a multi-period difference-in-differences(DID)model to empirically examine the impact of the legalization of local financial regulatory authority on firms’ capital income share. The results show that the legalization of local financial regulatory authority significantly reduces the income share of capital factors. Mechanism analysis indicates that this effect is primarily achieved by curbing shadow banking activities and restraining leverage manipulation. Heterogeneity analysis further reveals that the policy’s regulatory effect on capital income share is more pronounced among firms engaging in local financial activities through related parties,in regions with greater regulatory policy autonomy,stronger regulatory enforcement,and smaller implicit local government debt. The findings provide theoretical foundations and policy implications for strengthening the rule of law in local financial regulation and optimizing the structure of factor income distribution.更多还原