【摘要】 本文构建了一个包含银行部门的新货币主义理论模型，以分析信用交易对消费不平等的影响。在模型中，银行为交易者应对流动性冲击提供了流动性保险。然而，由于信贷摩擦和安全资产稀缺，银行部门的债务扩张受到约束，从而使经济呈现较低的产出、消费和利率水平。理论分析表明:信用交易概率上升会加剧银行部门的融资约束，进而抑制产出与消费，并最终降低消费不平等;而抵押品折扣率下降会缓解银行部门的融资约束，进而促进产出和消费增加，并加剧消费不平等。基于国家和地区层面的数据的实证检验支持了模型的主要结论。研究结论为政府推进金融发展和降低消费不平等提供了理论与事实依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article constructs a new monetarist theoretical model that incorporates a banking sector to analyze the impact of credit transactions on consumption inequality. In the model,banks provide liquidity insurance to help traders cope with liquidity shocks. However,due to credit friction and the scarcity of safe assets,the expansion of banking sector debt is constrained,resulting in lower levels of output,consumption,and interest rates in the economy. Theoretical analysis indicates that an increase in the probability of credit transactions exacerbates financing constraints in the banking sector,thereby suppressing output and consumption and ultimately reducing consumption inequality;conversely,a decrease in the collateral discount rate alleviates financing constraints in the banking sector,thereby promoting increases in output and consumption and exacerbating consumption inequality. Empirical tests based on national and regional-level data support the model’s main conclusions.The findings provide both theoretical and empirical grounds for governments to advance financial development and reduce consumption inequality.更多还原