【摘要】 面对复杂的供应链环境，构建长期合作关系是上下游企业利益共享、抵抗风险的有效手段，而长期合约是否具有“防重新谈判”性质起着重要的作用.因此，在制造商和零售商的两阶段合作中，考虑需求不确定且类型在不同阶段随机变化(由于零售商更了解市场需求，因此文中也简称为零售商类型),分别构建了非对称信息下(不)完全承诺的三种合约模型，并从防重新谈判的角度分析了三种模型中的最优合约及其性质.研究发现：最优防重新谈判合约与零售商类型在两阶段的相关性相关，随着相关性逐渐增加，最优防重新谈判合约依次是完全承诺分离合约、不完全承诺分离合约、不完全承诺混同合约；当相关性较小时，零售商类型在不同阶段变化较大，导致制造商第一阶段通过分离零售商类型获知的信息并不能指导第二阶段合约的制定，因此完全承诺分离合约具有防重新谈判的性质且是最优防重新谈判合约；制造商利用第一阶段更新的信息可以制定不完全承诺分离与混同合约，当其更关注第二阶段期望利润时，不完全承诺混同合约是最优防重新谈判合约.更多还原

【Abstract】 With the increasing complexity of the supply chain, the supply chain members aim to find ways to establish long-term cooperation which is an effective means of sharing benefits and mitigating risks. Renegotiation-proof contract plays an important role in long-term cooperation. This paper investigates the two-period cooperation between the manufacturer and retailer, considering that the retailer’s types(i.e., demand types) change stochastically across periods under demand uncertainty. This paper models three types of long-term contracts under asymmetric information and examines the optimal renegotiation-proof contract. The results show that the serial correlation of the retailer’s types influences the optimal renegotiation-proof contract. Specifically, as the correlation increases, the optimal renegotiation-proof contract consists of a separate contract with full commitment, a separate contract with commitment and renegotiation, and a pooling contract with commitment and renegotiation, respectively. The separate contract with full commitment is consistent with the optimal renegotiation-proof contract when the correlation is small, since the information obtained in the first period cannot be used to design the contract in the second period when the retailer’s type changes significantly over periods. The separate and pooling contracts with commitment and renegotiation can be updated with the first-period signal. However, the pooling contract with commitment and renegotiation is the optimal renegotiation-proof contract when the manufacturer prefers the second-period expected profit over that of the first period.更多还原