【摘要】 在我国公司治理股权集中的背景下，控股股东与实际控制人常借“幕后指示”干预董事决策、滥用控制权，形成“名义董事担责、双控人隐身”的治理漏洞，严重损害公司、股东及债权人的合法权益。新《公司法》第192条首次将此类间接侵权行为纳入规制，确立了影子董事制度雏形，但该条款过于概括化，尚未形成完整制度体系，在实践中面临主体范围局限、行为内容宽泛、责任认定模糊等法律适用困境。文章提出我国影子董事制度的完善路径：在主体范围上纳入特定债权人和监事，明确专业服务人员的排除条件及对实际控制人的界定；在行为内容上实现对象集体化、方式常态化以及效果价值化；在连带责任上明确责任的性质和形式，合理划分内部责任。对影子董事制度的完善，旨在实现控制权规制与市场效率的动态平衡。更多还原

【Abstract】 Under the background of concentrated equity in Chinese corporate governance, controlling shareholders and actual controllers often interfere with directors’ decisions through “behind-the-scenes instructions” and abuse their control rights, creating a governance loophole where “nominal directors take responsibility while the dual controllers remain hidden”, which seriously infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of the company,shareholders and creditors. Article 192 of the new Company Law has for the first time included such indirect infringement behaviors within the scope of regulation, establishing the rudimentary form of the shadow director system. However, this provision is overly general and has not yet formed a complete institutional framework. In practice, it faces legal application difficulties such as limited subject scope, broad behavioral content, and ambiguous responsibility determination. Therefore, targeted improvement paths for the shadow director system in China are proposed: including specific creditors and supervisors in the subject scope, clarifying the exclusion conditions for professional service personnel and the definition of actual controllers; object collectivization, regularization of methods and value-based effects in behavioral content; and clarification of the nature and form of joint liability and reasonable division of internal liability. Through the improvement of the shadow director system, the aim is to achieve a dynamic balance between control rights regulation and market efficiency.更多还原