【摘要】 通过构建一个两国模型，分析了放宽限制后的跨境损失补偿政策对国际税收竞争和社会福利的短期、中期和长期影响。研究表明，在短期内政府税率和资本分配未调整，引入跨境损失补偿会导致税收收入和社会福利下降。在中期，随着跨国企业和政府开始调整策略，政府会通过降低税率或其他税收优惠应对税基流失。在缺乏国际合作情况下，全球税率和社会福利呈现下降趋势。从长期来看，实施全球最低税率虽然能抑制税率的进一步下降，但不足以完全阻止税基流失和社会福利的减少。因此，跨境损失补偿机制虽然能减轻跨国企业的税收负担，但会伴随着税基侵蚀与社会福利下降的问题。这一研究假设不仅有助于理解现行的有限制的跨境损失补偿制度，也表明了在政策放宽情形下各国税收政策的调整需求，同时为未来欧盟及其他地区的税收协调与政策设计提供了理论依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper constructs a simple two-country model to analyze the short, medium, and long-term impacts of relaxing current cross-border loss offset policies on international tax competition and social welfare. The study finds that in the short term, with government tax rates and capital allocation unchanged, cross-border loss offsets reduce the national tax base, thereby leading to declines in both tax revenue and social welfare. In the medium term, as multinational corporations and governments adjust strategies, governments may reduce tax rates or offer other incentives to counter tax base erosion. In the absence of international cooperation, global tax rates and social welfare tend to decline. In the long term, implementing a global minimum tax rate may curb further rate reductions but may not fully prevent tax base erosion and reductions in social welfare.Thus, while cross-border loss offsets alleviate the tax burden on multinational corporations, they may lead to tax base erosion and welfare losses. The assumptions in this paper not only helps to understand the current restricted cross-border loss offset policies but also illustrate the need for tax policy adjustments under relaxed regulations, providing a theoretical basis for future tax coordination and policy design in the EU and other regions.更多还原