【摘要】 在荀子的思想中，究竟是“心”还是“欲”提供行动的动力，乃是一个重要的问题。这两种看法都有相应的文本解释根据。然而，它们对应的问题并不相同，带来的理论后果也颇有差别。尽管荀子“求者从所可”的说法蕴含着“心之所可”在追求行动中持续在场的意思，但在礼义文明产生之前，“心之所可”只是实现欲望的手段。在已有礼义文明之后，心对“道”的认可成为目的本身，心将“道”作为行动理由。从动机结构来说，“心”与“欲”都有动机效力，但符合道德的行动是由心所激发的。更多还原

【Abstract】 In Xunzi’s philosophy,what serves as the true source of motivation for human action:the mind(xin 心) or desires(yu 欲)?While most scholars contend that desires,in Xunzi’s view,can independently motivate action,others argue that for Xunzi,only the mind is truly motivational.Both positions draw on textual evidence.On the one hand,Xunzi states that people’s seeking(qiu求)follows what their mind approves of(ke 可);on the other hand,he also suggests that the mind’s approval merely determines the means to satisfy desires,while desires themselves constitute the sole source of motivation.However,these two interpretations are answering different questions,and their theoretical implications diverge significantly.This paper argues that,in understanding Xunzi’s system,it remains essential to reexamine the question of whether it is the mind or desires that motivate action.By analyzing the scholarly debate on this issue,the paper identifies a crucial distinction in Xunzi’s thought:the difference between two stages of human society—before and after the establishment of ritual civilization.It argues that for Xunzi,both the mind and desires can,at different points,function as independent sources of motivation.This does not reflect an inconsistency,but rather a nuanced view that humans are motivated by different faculties depending on the sociocultural context.Before ritual civilization,only desires could motivate action.After its establishment,however,the mind—through its capacity for moral judgment—could also motivate action.More specifically,a close textual analysis reveals that Xunzi’s claim in Chapter 22(Zhengming 正名)—that " those who seek to fulfill their desires follow what they approve of"—implies that the mind is involved in action,but does not necessarily indicate that it is motivational in itself.In the pre-ritual stage,the mind engages in activities such as deliberation(lü 虑),selection(ze择),weighing(quan权),and calculation(ji计),all of which serve merely to determine how best to satisfy preexisting desires.In contrast,after the formation of ritual civilization,the mind gains the capacity to both compel and restrain action.Its approval of the Way(Dao 道) can become an end in itself,thereby enabling the mind to take the Way as a reason for moral action.When the agent’s will is sufficiently strong,the motivational force of the mind’s approval of the Way can even surpass the strongest natural desire—namely,the desire to live—and lead to actions such as "relinquishing life and fulfilling one’s death"(Chapter 22).In short,although Xunzi recognizes both mind and desires as having motivational capacities,he ultimately holds that only the mind’s approval of the Way provides the motivation for genuinely moral action.更多还原