【摘要】 审计市场存在“事务所规模大—审计质量高”的一般关系，本文使用公司是否发生会计舞弊作为审计质量的代理变量，研究融券制度的实施能否提高大规模事务所的审计质量。研究发现，融券制度的实施显著提高了大规模事务所对公司会计舞弊的抑制作用。此外，融券制度对大规模事务所审计质量的影响在市场化程度高的地区、内部治理环境差和产权性质为民营的公司样本中更加显著。机制检验发现，融券制度通过促进负面信息传播和提高大规模事务所诉讼风险两种渠道提高大规模事务所防范公司会计舞弊的能力。本文的研究在理论上丰富了审计声誉理论和诉讼风险理论，在实践上为我国事务所从“做大”到“做强”的转变提供了经验借鉴。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is prevalent in the audit market that larger audit firms tend to have higher audit quality. This study employs the occurrence of accounting fraud as a proxy variable for audit quality to investigate whether the implementation of margin trading rules can enhance audit quality for large-scale audit firms. The research finds that the implementation of margin trading rules significantly enhances the ability of large-scale audit firms to deter accounting fraud. Furthermore, the impact of margin trading rules on the audit quality of large-scale firms is more pronounced in highly market-oriented regions, companies under poor internal governance and privately-owned companies. Mechanism tests reveal that margin trading rules enhance the ability of large-scale audit firms to prevent accounting fraud through two channels: facilitating negative information dissemination and increasing litigation risks. This study enriches theoretical perspectives on audit reputation and litigation risk theories, and practically provides experiential insights for the transformation of Chinese audit firms from “expansion” to “strengthening”.更多还原