【摘要】 中国地方政府债务规模持续增长的同时，跨区资本呈现出不对称流动的特征，严重影响财政金融的稳定，但鲜有文献对此作出系统解释。本文采用2008—2021年的地级市面板数据，实证检验了地方公共债务对资本跨区流动的效应与影响机制。研究发现，在财政纵向失衡程度低的地区，地方公共债务扩张导致资本净流入；在财政纵向失衡程度高的地区，地方公共债务扩张则导致资本净流出。机制分析表明，调整公共投资和实际税率是地方公共债务影响资本跨区流动的作用路径。异质性分析表明，承诺性税收征管策略的实施进一步强化了地方公共债务对资本的虹吸效应，而自愿性税收征管策略对资本的虹吸效应次之，强制性税收征管策略则无显著性影响。依赖条件分析表明，地方公共债务对资本流入的正向影响依赖于地区商业银行数字化程度和地区财政监管力度的提高。本文揭示了地方公共债务扩张导致不同地区的财政竞争工具政策效果出现明显分化，这一结论为地方政府因地制宜完善债务管理政策提供了有益参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 While China′s local public debt scale continues to expand, interregional capital flows exhibit an asymmetric pattern that significantly impacts economic and financial stability, yet prior literature rarely provides corresponding explanations for this phenomenon. This study employs prefecture-level panel data from 2008 to 2021 to examine the effect and mechanism of local public debt on cross-regional capital flows. The findings reveal that local public debt expansion leads to net capital inflows in regions with low fiscal vertical imbalance but results in net capital outflows in regions with high fiscal vertical imbalance. Mechanism analysis demonstrates that adjusting public investment and actual tax rates constitutes the pathway through which local public debt influences cross-regional capital flows. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that implementing pledge-based tax collection strategies most strongly amplifies the capital siphoning effect of local public debt, followed by voluntary strategies, while compulsory strategies show no significant effect. Conditional dependence analysis shows that the positive effect of local public debt on capital inflows relies on enhancements to both regional commercial bank digitalization levels and local fiscal supervision intensity. This paper reveals how local public debt expansion causes significant divergence in fiscal competition tools across regions, providing valuable insights for establishing context-specific debt management mechanisms in different areas.更多还原