【摘要】 董事高管责任保险的公司治理效应具有两面性：一方面，它能够激励管理层勤勉履职，并在保险公司的持续监督下优化企业内部控制，从而提升治理水平；另一方面，其风险转移功能可能诱发管理层的道德风险，助长机会主义行为，进而降低治理水平。本文基于2003—2022年A股上市公司的面板数据，建立固定效应模型检验董事高管责任保险与债务融资成本的关系，结果表明：企业投保董事高管责任保险将引发机会主义效应，董事高管责任保险通过降低会计稳健性进而增加企业债务融资成本，这一效应在非国有企业和机构投资者持股比例较低的企业中更为显著。继而本文提出了完善董事高管责任保险相关法律法规及公司治理与监督机制的建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The corporate governance effects of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance(D&O Insurance) are dualistic: on the one hand, it can motivate management to perform their duties diligently, and under the continuous oversight of insurance companies, to improve internal controls, thereby enhancing governance standards; on the other hand, its risk-shifting function may induce managerial moral hazards and foster opportunistic behaviors, ultimately impairing governance quality. Based on panel data from A-share listed companies in China from 2003 to 2022, this study establish a fixed effects model to examine the relationship between D&O insurance and debt financing costs. The results show that purchasing D&O insurance triggers opportunistic effects: it increases corporate debt financing costs by reducing accounting conservatism, and this effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and in firms with lower proportion of institutional investor ownership. The study further proposes recommendations to improve relevant laws and regulations regarding D&O insurance and to strengthen corporate governance and supervision mechanisms.更多还原