【摘要】 针对竞争供应链零售商的延保渠道结构选择问题,运用博弈论构建由两个制造商和两个零售商组成的对称性链与链竞争模型,通过比较不同延保渠道结构组合下的均衡结果,分析两个零售商的延保渠道结构选择策略、选择均衡和均衡性质.研究表明,当产品潜在市场规模相对较大时,零售商选择独立提供和销售延保服务,否则选择分销第三方延保服务;相比于集中化链与链竞争,分散化链与链竞争下使得零售商选择独立提供和销售延保服的产品潜在市场规模范围更小.当产品潜在市场规模足够大或足够小时,将形成两个零售商均独立提供和销售延保服务或均分销第三方延保服务的唯一均衡局面,否则将形成双均衡局面;均衡延保渠道结构能否实现两个零售商利润双赢显著依赖于产品潜在市场规模和产品替代程度.更多还原

【Abstract】 Considering retailers’ extended warranty channel choice problem under competing supply chains, a symmetrical chain-to-chain competition model consisting of two manufacturers and two retailers is established.By comparing equilibrium results under various extended warranty channel combinations, this paper studies two retailers’ extended warranty channel choice strategies, choice equilibria and equilibrium characteristics.The results show that each retailer acts as an extended warranty provider for large product potential market size, and acts as a reseller in other cases. As compared with centralized chain-to-chain competition, the range of product potential market size in which each retailer prefers to be a provider is smaller under decentralized chainto-chain competition. If the product potential market size is large or small enough, both retailers providing and selling extended warranties independently or reselling third parties’ extended warranties arises as the unique equilibrium. Or else, there exist double equilibria. Whether equilibrium channel profits both retailers depends on product potential market size and product substitutability significantly.更多还原