【摘要】 大科层体系是对社会主义国有经济的组织刻画,国有企业则是国家这个有意识合作大陆的有机分支。建设时期,工业化目标与多重约束条件要求科层体系的权威控制完全取代市场主体间自发交易,社会主义积累规律发挥主导作用。通过企业剩余权向国家分级集中、职工通过企业而组织起来,国家、生产单位和生产者个人的物质利益矛盾在宏观计划体制与微观单位体制中解决。面对信息阻塞下的弱激励困境,大科层体系通过条—块关系的结构性调整将剩余权合理下放,而弱激励引发的官僚主义弊病又要求有促进企业决策者—职工利益相容的治理结构与之适应。此时国家与企业、企业与职工间分别存在央地政府和双重治理的中介职能调整关系,两者的不断再生产使国企成为条条与块块的联通器和国家与职工的联结器,在价值规律引入后,前者表现为国企适度集中与央地双向合作,后者表现为党的领导融入公司治理。更多还原

【Abstract】 The grand bureaucratic system organizationally characterized China’s state-owned economy,with SOEs serving as organic branches of the state.Industrialization goals and constraints required authoritative bureaucratic control to replace spontaneous market transactions,enabling socialist accumulation.Contradictions in material interests among the state,production units,and individuals were resolved by centralizing enterprise surplus rights and organizing labor through enterprises within the macro planned and micro work unit systems.Confronting weak incentives from information blockages,the system decentralized surplus rights through structural vertical-horizontal(tiao-kuai)adjustments.Bureaucratic ailments further necessitated governance structures that aligned interests between managers and workers.These intermediary adjustments—in state-enterprise and enterprise-labor relations—continuously reproduced SOEs as connectors linking central-local authorities and state-society.After introducing market mechanisms,this manifested as moderated centralization with bidirectional central-local cooperation and the integration of Party leadership into corporate governance.更多还原