【摘要】 法学(法教义学)作为一门具有明显“实践干预”性质(实践性)的学问,应以“法理”作为自己的研究对象。但“法理”并不是“自明的”(“明见的”),不会自动地呈现(或反映)在我们的知觉系统之中,这就需要将“理解”或“理解的体系”作为认识它的一种基本方式。法学上的“理解”对于法理的认识不一定能够达到“全真”“百分之百的真”“绝对真”,但可以实现“逼真”或者“适真”的要求,并在法学知识共同体内部得到普遍承认、接受和认同,形成“共同的科学确信”和“共同的法确信”,即法学知识共同体内部“视其为真”。这种特定的“主体间确信的真理”的形成需要经历一个特殊的复杂的科学化作业,这个过程伴随着从“意见”不断向“知识”或“真理”的梯度上升。所有致力于将法学建构成为科学体系的法学者都应当有这样的认识,并通过自身的学术努力和贡献逐步实现法学的科学化、实现“法律科学真理”的理想。更多还原

【Abstract】 Jurisprudence—particularly legal dogmatics—by virtue of its pronounced practical-interventionist character, must take ratio juris as its principal object of inquiry. Yet ratio juris is not selfevident; it does not naturally disclose itself within our perceptual system. This makes understanding, or a structured system of understanding, indispensable as a basic epistemic mode through which ratio juris can be apprehended. In legal scholarship, such understanding does not necessarily yield “complete truth”, “perfect truth”, or “absolute truth”. Nevertheless, it can achieve verisimilitude or adequate truth, which may be broadly recognised, accepted, and endorsed within the epistemic community of legal scholars. Through this process, the community forms a “ shared scientific conviction ” and a “ shared legal conviction”—effectively “taking it to be true” in an intersubjective sense. The emergence of this form of intersubjectively secured truth requires a distinctive and complex scientific process, one that involves a gradual ascent from mere “opinion” toward “knowledge” or “truth”. Legal scholars who aspire to build jurisprudence into a scientific discipline must be cognizant of this requirement and, through sustained scholarly effort and contribution, progressively advance the scientification of jurisprudence and the ideal of “legal-scientific truth”.更多还原