【摘要】 为提升煤矿安全监测监控系统实用性，通过构建动态演化博弈模型，分析监测监控系统使用人员与被监测对象之间的动态博弈趋势。模型以两大主体的策略变化为核心，探讨了参数变化对策略趋势及其收敛状态的影响，提出了优化监测监控的检查方式与奖惩制度。结合研究对模型参数进行了调整和优化，并通过实际应用的方式计算转化系数，进而对博弈模型参数进行了验证。最终在制定安全目标、解决信息不对称问题、评估安全检测监控工作和制定安全检测策略细则等方面进行了博弈模型的实践和推广。研究发现，博弈双方均表现出“动态感染”特性，即一方的策略变化会引起另一方的策略调整；同时，博弈双方中一方是主动方，另一方是被动方，主动方的不同极端策略（y≤0.1或y≥0.9）随着时间的推移能够完全影响被动方，被动方的极端策略对主动方的影响则不完全；此外，“充分配合”参数J和d的增加会促进两大主体策略向1收敛，表明更高的初始意愿加速了收敛过程；而“负收益”参数j减少50%时和“正收益”参数b增加50%时，则增强了监测监控工作的开展，然而当b值下降超过阈值（3.42%）时，监测监控人员可能转向不充分工作。研究成果为煤矿企业提供了定量分析工具，以制定适合自身条件的安全监测监控策略，从而有助于提高系统的运行效率和企业的安全管理水平。通过优化参数和调整策略，以期煤矿安全监测监控系统能够更有效地服务于煤矿安全生产，减少事故发生，保障矿工生命安全。更多还原

【Abstract】 To enhance the practical application of the coal mine safety monitoring and control system, by constructing a dynamic evolutionary game model, the dynamic game trend between the users of the monitoring and control system and the monitored objects is analyzed. The model takes the strategy changes of the two major subjects as the core, explores the influence of parameter changes on the strategy trend and its convergence state, and proposes the inspection method and reward and punishment system for optimizing monitoring and control. The model parameters were adjusted and optimized in combination with previous studies, and the transformation coefficient was calculated through practical applications, thereby verifying the parameters of the game model. Ultimately, the game model was practiced and promoted in aspects such as formulating safety goals, solving the problem of information asymmetry, evaluating safety detection and monitoring work, and formulating detailed rules of safety detection strategies. The research finds that both sides of the game exhibit the characteristic of “dynamic infection”, that is, the strategy change of one side will cause the strategy adjustment of the other side. Meanwhile, among the two sides of the game, one side is the active side and the other side is the passive side. The different extreme strategies of the active side(y≤0.1 or y≥0.9) can completely affect the passive side over time, while the extreme strategies of the passive side have an incomplete impact on the active side; furthermore, the increase of the “full cooperation” parameters J and d will promote the convergence of the two main strategies to 1, indicating that a higher initial intention accelerates the convergence process; when the “negative return” parameter j decreases by 50% and the “positive return” parameter b increases by 50%, the implementation of monitoring and control work is enhanced. However, when the b value drops by more than the threshold(3.42%), monitoring and control personnel may turn to inadequate work. The study results provide quantitative analysis tools for coal mining enterprises to formulate safety monitoring and control strategies suitable for their own conditions, thereby helping to improve the operational efficiency of the system and the safety management level of the enterprise. By optimizing parameters and adjusting strategies, it is expected that the coal mine safety monitoring and control system can serve the safe production of coal mines more effectively, reduce the occurrence of accidents, and ensure the life safety of miners.更多还原