【摘要】 去杠杆有助于长期防范和化解系统性金融风险已成为普遍共识，但鲜有文献探讨其如何影响企业短期债务违约风险。本文研究发现，公司去杠杆短期内会增大借款逾期程度。机制检验表明，非结构性去杠杆、操纵式去杠杆以及信贷约束下去杠杆降低了企业融资能力，导致企业无法偿还债务而引起借款逾期。异质性检验表明，公司去除“不合适”杠杆、提高股权制衡度、减缓规模扩张及减少金融资产配置均有助于缓解去杠杆对借款逾期产生的负面效应。进一步研究表明，不同债务类型以及不同时期的去杠杆对借款逾期影响不同。本文研究补充了去杠杆经济后果与债务违约影响因素方面文献，为进一步优化我国企业结构性去杠杆工作、平衡“去杠杆”与“稳增长”目标提供了政策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Deleveraging is helpful to reduce systemic financial risks in the long term, yet how it affects the short-term risks of enterprises is under explored. Based on China’s A-share non-financial listed companies, this paper studies the impact of deleveraging on corporate debt default. We find that corporate deleveraging will increase the severity of debt defaults. The mechanism test shows that unstructured deleveraging, manipulative deleveraging, and deleveraging under credit constraints all reduce corporate financing ability, leading to an inability to repay debts, which subsequently results in loan defaults. The heterogeneity test indicates that removing“inappropriate” leverage, improving equity balance, slowing down expansion, and reducing financial asset allocation all help mitigate the negative effects of deleveraging on loan defaults. In addition, the impact of deleveraging on the degree of corporate debt default varies significantly by type and period. This paper supplements the literature on the economic consequences of deleveraging and the influencing factors of debt default, and provides policy references for optimizing the structural deleveraging work of Chinese enterprises and balancing the goals of“deleveraging” and“stable growth”.更多还原