【摘要】 信用评级有效性依赖于信息的充分获取与客观解读。然而，传统投资者付费评级与发行者付费评级分别存在信息获取限制和独立性不足的问题。本文聚焦政府在债券信用评级市场中的潜在作用，基于具有政府参与特征的中债隐含评级，考察其识别债券信用风险的有效性及机制。研究发现：中债隐含评级能够识别债券信用风险；相较于投资者付费评级，其提供了显著的增量信息；相比发行者付费评级，其能将信息内化为更高的评级质量；政府参与是其优势形成的关键。此外，中债隐含评级降低了投资者对传统评级的依赖，并改善了债券市场的信息环境。本文为信用评级有效性及政府与市场间关系的研究提供了新的证据和视角，对于当下我国评级行业优化及债券市场健康发展具有重要现实意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The effectiveness of credit ratings depends on the adequate acquisition and objective interpretation of information. However, traditional investor-pay rating and issuer-pay rating are respectively constrained by limited information access and compromised independence. Based on the ChinaBond Market Implied Rating with the characteristics of government participation, this paper examines it’s effectiveness and mechanisms of identifying bond credit risk. The study found that: ChinaBond Market Implied Rating can identify bond credit risk; Compared with investor-paid rating, it provides significant incremental information; Compared with issuer-paid rating, it can better internalize information into rating quality; Government involvement is key to its advantage; ChinaBond Market Implied Rating reduces investors’ dependence on traditional ratings and improves the information environment of the bond market. This research contributes new evidence and a novel perspective to the literature on rating efficacy and the state-market nexus, offering substantial policy implications for reforming China’s rating industry and fostering a robust domestic bond market.更多还原