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同行技术竞争压力与企业避税行为

Technology Competition Peer Pressure and Corporate Tax Avoidance

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【作者】 马永强; 陈伟忠;

【Author】 Ma Yongqiang;Chen Weizhong;

【通讯作者】 陈伟忠;

【机构】 西南财经大学会计学院;

【摘要】 知识经济时代下,诸多企业面临严重的同行技术竞争压力,同行技术竞争压力的经济后果值得重点关注。本文实证检验了同行技术竞争压力对企业避税行为的影响作用,研究发现:同行技术竞争压力显著促进了企业的避税行为,上述结论经过系列稳健性和内生性检验后仍然成立。机制检验发现,融资需求和经营风险是同行技术竞争压力促进企业避税行为的主要路径机制。横截面检验发现,主回归作用在政府补贴低、高管薪酬激励强以及投资者负面情绪高的样本中更显著。进一步研究发现,企业将避税所获的内源性融资更多用于了研发创新。最后,研究发现区别于同行技术竞争压力,市场份额等其他维度的同行竞争与企业避税行为并不存在显著关系。本文揭示了技术维度的同行竞争压力对企业避税行为的影响及其内在机理,为深刻理解行业竞争与避税行为的关系提供了参考。

【Abstract】 In the era of knowledge economy, many enterprises are facing serious pressure of peer technology competition, and the economic consequences of peer technology competition pressure deserve more attention. This paper empirically examines the impact of peer technology competition pressure on corporate tax avoidance, and finds that peer technology competition pressure significantly promotes corporate tax avoidance. The results show that financing needs and operational risks are the main mechanism through which peer technology competition pressure promotes corporate tax avoidance. The cross-sectional test finds that the main regression effect is more significant in the samples with low government subsidy, strong executive compensation incentive and high negative investor sentiment. Further studies show that the endogenous financing obtained from tax avoidance is more used for R&D innovation. Finally, we find that different from the pressure of peer technology competition, peer competition in other dimensions such as market share does not have a significant relationship with corporate tax avoidance. This paper reveals the impact of technological peer competition pressure on corporate tax avoidance and its internal mechanism, which provides a reference for deeply understanding the relationship between industrial competition and tax avoidance.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金重点国际合作研究项目(72010107001);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72372135);西南财经大学研究生代表性成果培育项目(JGS2024064)的资助
  • 【文献出处】 会计研究 ,Accounting Research , 编辑部邮箱 ,2025年06期
  • 【分类号】F275.4;F271;F812.42;F832.51
  • 【下载频次】616
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