【摘要】 本文以2015年新《预算法》的实施为准自然实验，基于企业税收筹划的“收益—成本”权衡，考察地方政府债务治理对企业避税行为的影响。双重差分估计结果表明，地方政府债务治理显著抑制了企业的避税行为，且该效应在非国有企业、管理层风险偏好高的企业，以及财政压力大和税收征管强度高的地区更为显著。机制分析显示，地方政府债务治理通过缓解企业融资约束，降低避税的边际收益，减少企业避税行为；同时，通过提升企业避税的潜在稽查成本，抑制企业的避税行为。此外，研究发现，地方政府债务治理对“集团公司通过内部资本结构避税”的行为同样具有显著抑制作用。本研究为深入理解债务治理在优化税收环境和推动经济高质量发展中的作用提供了重要依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper uses the 2015 implementation of the new Budget Law as a quasi-natural experiment to explore how local government debt governance impacts corporate tax avoidance. Difference-in-differences results show that debt governance significantly reduces tax avoidance, especially in Non-SOE firms, those with higher managerial risk appetite, and regions with greater fiscal pressure or stronger tax enforcement. Mechanism analysis reveals that debt governance alleviates firms’ financing constraints, reducing the marginal benefits of tax avoidance, while increasing potential audit costs, further discouraging such behavior. Additionally, debt governance curbs tax avoidance through internal capital structures in corporate groups. These findings highlight the role of debt governance in optimizing the tax environment and promoting high-quality economic development.更多还原