【摘要】 本文根据政府部门和国企经理人不同行为策略构成的收益矩阵,构建不同奖惩机制下二者的演化博弈模型,分析演化稳定策略并进行算例描述与仿真。仿真证实:静态奖惩机制、动态奖励静态惩罚机制下的演化博弈不存在渐进稳定点,而静态奖励动态惩罚机制、动态奖惩机制下的博弈系统存在渐近稳定点,且动态奖惩机制下效果更优。研究结论表明,政府应当考虑从奖励与惩罚的动态视角调整现有的国企红利上缴制度设计,推动双方博弈向稳定策略发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the payoff matrix formed by the behavioral strategies of government departments and SOE managers, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between government departments and SOE managers under different reward and punishment mechanisms. The evolutionary stability strategies of the system are analyzed, and numerical examples along with simulations are provided. Simulations confirm that under static reward-punishment mechanisms and dynamic reward with static punishment mechanisms,the evolutionary game lacks an asymptotically stable point. In contrast, under static reward with dynamic punishment mechanisms and dynamic reward-punishment mechanisms, the game system exhibits asymptotically stable points, with the dynamic reward-punishment mechanism demonstrating superior evolutionary outcomes. The findings suggest that the government should consider adjusting the current institutional design for SOE dividend payouts from a dynamic perspective of rewards and punishments to steer the game between both parties toward a stable strategy.更多还原