【摘要】 并购活动是上市公司提升效率、转型升级、保持核心竞争力的重要方式之一。伴随着中国多项并购重组政策的出台，资本市场并购活动愈发活跃。但在机会主义动机和信息不对称等因素的影响下，多数并购活动并未实现预期中的协同效应，反而使企业的发展受阻。在此背景下，深入研究上市公司并购活动以提升并购效率成为学术界的重点研究话题。在并购活动持续增加的同时，收购方偏好以何种持股比例来实现并购目的，其背后的动机及行为如何影响并购效果尚未可知。由此，以2008年至2023年A股上市公司并购数据为基础，采用固定效应回归模型，研究从短期和长期两个维度考察并购过程中不同持股比例下的并购绩效，并进一步分析其背后动机。研究发现，在并购活动中，低持股比例可以为收购方带来更高的短期市场反应，但从长期绩效表现看，该并购行为却具有更差的市场绩效和财务绩效，导致投资者利益受损；进一步分析可知，低持股比例下的并购活动会产生更高的商誉和溢价率，在并购后具有更差的业绩承诺表现，证明其并购质量不佳；同时，对并购动机进行分析后发现，收购方试图通过操纵并购活动过程中的持股比例高低来粉饰报表，实现财务报表的美化；最后，在排除可能的替代性解释后，研究结论依旧成立。研究结论表明，低持股比例并购活动已经日渐成为部分上市公司进行报表粉饰的手段之一，并可能损害中小投资者利益。该结论既有助于丰富并购持股比例的相关研究，对会计准则制定者提供更多的解读和建议，也可以推动监管部门切实履行“两维护一促进”的监管职责，更好地维护资本市场之“本”。更多还原

【Abstract】 Mergers and Acquisitions(M&A) serve as a fundamental method for listed companies to enhance efficiency, drive transformation, and maintain core competitiveness. Against the backdrop of increasingly active M&A activities in China′s capital market following a series of policy initiatives, a substantial proportion of transactions fail to realize the anticipated synergies and instead impede firm development, largely due to opportunistic incentives and severe information asymmetry. This context underscores the importance of conducting in-depth research on M&A activities among listed firms to better understand the determinants of M&A efficiency. However, as M&A activities continue to grow, it remains unclear what share of equity acquirers prefer to acquire to achieve their M&A objectives, and how the underlying motives and behaviors behind these choices affect M&A quality.To address this gap, this study utilizes M&A data from A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2023 and employs a fixed-effects regression model to examine the impact of different share of equity on M&A performance from both shortterm and long-term perspectives, and further analyzes the underlying motives.The findings reveal that while lower share of equity in M&As can generate a more pronounced positive short-term market reaction for the acquirer, they are associated with worse long-term market and accounting performance, ultimately damaging investor interests. Further analysis indicates that M&As with lower share of equity typically involve higher goodwill, higher M&A premiums, and poorer post-M&A performance in meeting M&A performance commitments, evidencing lower M&A quality. Moreover, the analysis of motives suggests that acquirers strategically manipulate share of equity to engage in a more concealed form of earnings management for the purpose of financial statement embellishment. These core conclusions remain robust after considering potential alternative explanations.The study concludes that M&As with low share of equity have increasingly become a tool for financial statement embellishment by some listed companies, potentially harming the interests of minority investors. These findings contribute to the literature on share of equity in M&As and offer insights and recommendations for accounting standard setters. They also underscore the need for regulators to strengthen oversight to better uphold the fundamental principles of the capital market.更多还原