【摘要】 发挥国有企业杠杆监管的投资治理作用，对推动有为政府和有效市场更好结合具有重要意义。将国有企业杠杆监管政策实施视为准自然实验，以2010—2022年沪深A股国有非金融上市企业为样本，运用强度双重差分模型，研究杠杆监管对国有企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制。研究发现，杠杆监管能通过推动国有企业调整杠杆水平显著提高投资效率，主要体现在抑制过度投资方面。异质性分析发现，杠杆监管对投资效率的提升作用在地方级和杠杆向下调整的国有企业中更为显著。机制分析表明，杠杆监管提升投资效率主要源于削弱杠杆棘轮效应，并且通过融资约束的倒逼效应抑制杠杆向下调整企业的过度投资，以及增强监督减少投资不足；减少长期债务较多的国有企业在杠杆监管政策实施后投资效率明显提升。更多还原

【Abstract】 The supervision of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)’ leverage is crucial for adjusting the leverage level of state-owned enterprises,and even affects the efficiency of investment. Clarifying how to harness the investment governance role of SOEs leverage regulation holds significant importance for promoting a more effective combination of proactive government intervention and efficient market mechanisms.This study treats the implementation of SOEs leverage regulation policies as a quasi-natural experiment, utilizing data from non-financial listed SOEs in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2022.Employing a generalized Difference-in-Differences model, we investigate the impact of leverage regulation on the investment efficiency of SOEs and its underlying mechanisms. The findings reveal that leverage regulation significantly enhances investment efficiency by prompting SOEs to adjust their leverage levels,particularly through curbing excessive investments. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the positive effect of leverage regulation on investment efficiency is more pronounced among local-level SOEs and those undergoing downward adjustments in their leverage ratios. Mechanism analysis suggests that improvements in investment efficiency primarily stem from mitigating the levered ratchet effect. Additionally,it suppresses excessive investments in firms adjusting downwards through financing constraints’ coercive effects while enhancing oversight effectiveness to reduce underinvestment. Furthermore, it was observed that SOEs which reduced long-term debt exhibited notable increases in investment efficiency following the implementation of leveraging regulations.更多还原