【摘要】 自2014年克里米亚危机以来，俄罗斯持续承受来自美欧等西方国家多轮严厉的经济制裁，这些制裁的规模、广度和强度均创历史新高，引发俄罗斯“资本外流-卢布贬值”连锁反应，严重冲击金融体系稳定性。本文通过使用俄罗斯2011—2022年的季度数据对地缘政治风险和经济韧性进行计算，探究了前者与后者不同的变动趋势，并分析了引起这一变动的原因。研究发现，第一，在2011Q1—2022Q4之间发生的所有地缘政治风险事件中，2014年的克里米亚事件对俄罗斯的整体经济韧性、宏观经济韧性、微观市场效率、对外开放韧性、能源韧性和治理环境韧性均产生了小幅度且短期的负面影响，而对创新韧性和可持续发展韧性的负面影响则较为强烈。第二，“北溪-2”号天然气管道被破坏和俄乌冲突对俄罗斯的整体经济韧性和宏观经济韧性都产生了长期且较大的负面影响，对于微观市场效率、可持续发展韧性和治理环境韧性仅产生了小幅度的负面影响，而由于俄罗斯长期战略的作用，创新韧性和能源韧性在俄乌冲突期间出现了显著上升，同时，对外开放韧性的波动幅度也开始减小。第三，在俄罗斯一系列反制裁措施的支持下，其他地缘政治风险事件均未对俄罗斯的经济韧性造成明显影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 2014 Crimean crisis, Russia has continuously faced multiple rounds of severe economic sanctions from Western countries such as the United States and Europe. These sanctions have reached unprecedented levels in scale, scope, and intensity, triggering a chain reaction of “capital outflow and ruble depreciation” that has severely impacted the stability of the financial system. This paper employs quarterly data from 2011 to 2022 to measure both geopolitical risks and economic resilience in Russia, exploring the divergent trends between the two and analyzing the underlying causes of these changes.The study finds that, first, among all geopolitical risk events occurring between Q1 2011 and Q4 2022, the 2014 Crimean incident exerted a slight and short-term negative impact on Russia’s overall economic resilience, macroeconomic resilience, micro-market efficiency, openness resilience, energy resilience, and governance environment resilience, while its negative effect on innovation resilience and sustainable development resilience was relatively pronounced.Second, the sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and the Russia–Ukraine conflict have had long-term and significant negative impacts on Russia’s overall economic and macroeconomic resilience. Their impacts on micro-market efficiency, sustainable development resilience, and governance environment resilience were only marginal. Meanwhile, owing to Russia’s long-term strategic efforts, innovation resilience and energy resilience experienced a notable increase during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and fluctuations in openness resilience began to diminish. Third, supported by a series of counter-sanction measures, other geopolitical risk events did not have a significant impact on Russia’s economic resilience.更多还原