【摘要】 针对当前港口企业降碳难题，采用前景理论修正后的演化博弈方法，构建地方政府和港口企业的双方演化博弈模型，对比研究中央政府制定不同碳减排政策时地方政府与港口企业的演化稳定策略，并运用MATLAB进行仿真实验。研究表明：在无政策制定、碳补贴和碳惩罚组合、碳补贴和碳交易组合3种碳减排政策下，碳补贴和碳交易的组合政策更利于推动港口企业积极降碳；当港口企业积极降碳获得的主观感知收益与碳交易感知收益之和，高于消极降碳的主观感知收益与碳交易感知损失之和时，港口企业会自发积极降碳；与提高地方政府对港口企业降碳成本的补贴力度相比，设置较高的碳交易价格会进一步推动港口企业积极降碳。更多还原

【Abstract】 In view of the current problem of reducing the carbon emissions of port enterprises, the evolutionary game model of local governments and port enterprises was constructed by adopting the evolutionary game method modified by prospect theory. The evolutionary stability strategies of local governments and ports were comparatively studied when the central government formulated different carbon emission reduction policies, and MATLAB was used for simulation experiments. The research shows that under three kinds of carbon emission reduction policies, that is no policy formulation, carbon subsidy and carbon penalty combination, carbon subsidy and carbon trading combination, the last one is more conducive to promoting port enterprises to actively reduce carbon emissions. When the sum of the subjective perceived benefit and the perceived benefit of carbon trading obtained by the port enterprises actively reducing carbon is higher than the sum of the subjective perceived benefit and the perceived loss of carbon trading obtained by negatively reducing carbon, the port enterprises will spontaneously and actively reduce carbon emissions. Compared with increasing local governments subsidies for port enterprises, setting higher carbon trading prices will further promote port enterprises to actively reduce carbon emissions.更多还原