【摘要】 以地方证监局“双随机、一公开”监管为外生冲击，考察一线监管对企业风险信息披露的影响。结果显示：地方证监局“双随机、一公开”监管对企业风险信息披露具有良好的监管效果，即被监管企业愿意披露更多的风险信息。完善企业内部控制、降低投资者负面预期是实现良好监管效果的作用机制。这一监管效果在没有诉讼风险、没有监管处罚风险、分层随机抽选检查对象与监管资源约束较强地区的企业更明显，且监管效果有助于投资者利益保护与增加企业融资资源。鉴于此，应进一步完善地方证监局随机抽查监管机制，持续关注企业风险信息披露，以利于投资者决策及资本市场资源的合理配置。更多还原

【Abstract】 Using the “double random and one public” supervision by local securities regulatory bureaus as an exogenous shock, this study examines the impact of frontline regulatory oversight on enterprise risk information disclosure. The results show that the “double random and one public” supervision of local securities regulatory bureaus demonstrates a good regulatory effect on enterprise risk information disclosure, indicating that regulated enterprises are willing to disclose more risk information. Improving enterprise internal controls and reducing negative investor expectations are the mechanisms through which good regulatory effect can be achieved. This regulatory effect is more pronounced in enterprises with no litigation risks, no regulatory punishment risks, in areas where stratified random selection of inspection targets, and in areas with strong constraints on regulatory resources, and the regulatory effect contributes to investor protection and increases enterprise financing resources. In view of this, the random inspection and supervision mechanism of local securities regulatory bureaus should be further improved, and continuous attention should be paid to the disclosure of enterprise risk information, in order to facilitate investor decision and reasonable allocation of capital market resources.更多还原