【摘要】 现有的失业保险理论将求职货币投入视为影响失业者求职努力的重要因素，但并未研究考虑货币投入后失业保险将如何影响劳动力市场均衡与失业率。本文将失业者的求职货币投入纳入分析，扩展了经典的劳动力市场匹配模型，运用数值模拟方法探究了失业保险政策对失业率的影响。理论分析表明:在考虑失业者求职货币投入决策后，失业率随失业金替代率的提升呈现U型变化特征。这为我国当前失业金替代率较低时适度提高失业金标准的政策提供了理论依据。本文还首次探讨了我国失业保险基金结余过高形成的“负向补贴”对再就业的影响。研究发现，负向补贴在替代率较低时会抑制再就业、提高失业率，可对我国进一步完善失业保险补贴政策、提供失业保险基金利用率提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Existing unemployment insurance theory treats the unemployed’s monetary inputs as an important factor influencing their job search efforts,but it has not investigated how unemployment insurance will affect labor market equilibrium and the unemployment rate after accounting for the monetary input. This paper incorporated the job search monetary input of the unemployed into the analysis,extended the classic matching model,and used numerical simulation methods to explore the impact of unemployment insurance policy on the unemployment rate. Our analysis indicates that after considering the unemployed’s decision on monetary input for job search,the unemployment rate exhibits a U-shaped relationship along with the increase in the replacement rate of the unemployment compensation. This finding provides a theoretical basis for the current policy of moderately increasing unemployment insurance benefits in China when the replacement rate is relatively low. Furthermore,this paper is the first to explore the impact of the“negative subsidy”formed by the excessive surplus of China’s unemployment insurance fund on re-employment.The study finds that this negative subsidy inhibits re-employment and increases the unemployment rate when the replacement rate is low. This result offers a reference for China to further refine its unemployment insurance subsidy policies and improve the utilization rate of the unemployment insurance fund.更多还原