【摘要】 现象意识问题是当前哲学研究的重要话题，但如何研究却是相当棘手。通常要确定现象意识状态不可避免的需要报告，如果没有了报告，现象意识是否还存在？对于认知取用是否部分地构成了现象意识，相关性研究的NCC(1)进路表明主动报告与无报告的范式都存在不同类别的混淆风险；因果性研究的自然类进路则在簇数量识别问题上过于理想化。但是，相比之下，自然类进路可以容纳更多的理论发展空间，且对经验领域保持开放。文章最后，我将对自然类进路反驳予以回应，表明自然类进路在研究现象意识问题上是适用的。更多还原

【Abstract】 The problem of phenomenal consciousness is an important topic in current philosophical debates, but how to approach it properly remains tricky. Typically, identifying states of phenomenal consciousness inevitably requires reports. Without reports, does phenomenal consciousness still exist? Regarding whether cognitive access partly constitutes phenomenal consciousness, the NCC(Neural Correlates of Consciousness) approach suggests that both active-report and no-report paradigms carry different categories of confounding risks. On the other hand, the natural kind approach in causal research is overly idealized in terms of identifying the number of clusters. However, comparatively, the natural kind approach allows for more theoretical development and remains open to the empirical domain. In the final section of the paper, I will respond to criticisms of the natural kind approach, demonstrating that it is suitable for studying the problem of phenomenal consciousness.更多还原