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监管型小股东持股的未预期效应——来自年报可读性的证据

The Unintended Effects of Regulatory Minority Shareholding:Evidences from the Readability of Annual Reports

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【作者】 肖帅莹伍利娜

【Author】 XIAO Shuai-ying;WU Li-na;

【通讯作者】 伍利娜;

【机构】 北京大学光华管理学院

【摘要】 本文采用双重差分模型考察中证中小投资者服务中心持股对公司年报文本可读性的影响。研究发现,相对于非试点区域的公司,投服中心持股试点区域的公司在试点之后降低了年报文本可读性;经过倾向得分匹配、安慰剂检验等一系列稳健性检验,结果依然成立。异质性分析发现,以上结果主要出现在非国有性质、股权制衡度较高、管理层领取超额薪酬、控股股东掏空程度较高以及股吧讨论度较低的公司中。上述研究结果表明,投服中心持股后,公司内部人出于自利动机而实施了监管规避行为,策略性降低公司年报文本可读性。本文的研究结论揭示了投服中心持股的未预期效应,有助于全面认识和评估投服中心的监管效果,也有助于未来进一步完善投服中心的治理职能,对于证券监管实践具有一定启示意义。

【Abstract】 This paper uses a difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of the China Securities Investor Services Center’s(ISC)shareholding on the readability of annual report texts of listed companies. The study finds that, relative to companies in non-pilot regions, companies in ISC’s shareholding pilot regions reduce the readability of their annual report texts after the pilot.The results remain robust after a series of robustness tests, including propensity score matching and placebo tests, etc.Cross-sectional analysis shows that the above results mainly occur in companies with non-state-owned nature, high degree of equity balance, excessive compensation of management, high degree of controlling shareholder tunneling and low degree of stock forum discussion.The research results indicate that after ISC’s shareholding, insiders of the company implement regulatory circumvention behavior to protect their private interests, and strategically reduce the quality of non-financial information of the company.The research conclusions reveal the unintended effects of ISC’s shareholding, which are helpful to comprehensively understand and evaluate the regulatory effects of ISC, and to further improve the governance functions of ISC in the future.These insights hold significant implications for securities regulatory practices.

【基金】 国家自然科学基金青年项目“企业基金会研究:设立动机、运营表现与经济后果”(项目编号:72202014)
  • 【文献出处】 中央财经大学学报 ,Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2024年11期
  • 【分类号】F832.51
  • 【下载频次】119
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