【摘要】 中央对特别行政区监督权源于中央授权所形成的权力秩序。这一学理概念引发了学界对监督内容、监督方式等具体问题的讨论，其背后反映出对为何监督的理论分析不足。国家统一原则作为我国的一项宪制秩序，主要包括单一制、地方自治、资源更优配置三项子原则，为中央对特别行政区监督权提供了价值指引。一方面，国家统一原则使得宪法加入了第31条，中央需要在“必要”时行使权力；另一方面，国家统一原则明确了中央作为制度的决定者与参与者具有双重身份，须根据特定情形行使不同的权力。由此，中央对特别行政区监督权形成了纠正式监督与支持式监督两种功能。同时在此引领下构建了中央受动、联动、主动的监督方式，成文与不成文的规范依据以及决定者与参与者的不同行使机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 The central government’s supervisory power over the special administrative regions originates from the power order brought about by the central government’s authorization. This theoretical concept has triggered discussions in academia on specific issues such as the content and methods of supervision, which reflects the lack of theoretical analysis on why supervision is necessary.The principle of national unity, as a constitutional order in China, mainly includes three sub-principles:unitary system, local autonomy, and better allocation of resources, which provide value guidance for the central government’s supervisory power over the special administrative regions. On the one hand, the principle of national unity has led to the addition of Article 31 to the Constitution, and the central government needs to exercise power when“necessary”; on the other hand, the principle of national unity clarifies that the central government has a dual identity as a decision maker and participant in the system, and must exercise different powers according to specific circumstances. As a result, the central government’s supervisory power over the special administrative regions performs two functions:corrective supervision and supportive supervision. At the same time, under such guidance, the central government’s reactive, linked, and proactive supervision methods, written and unwritten normative bases, and different exercise mechanisms for decision makers and participants have been constructed.更多还原