【摘要】 为厘清公共产品技术创新中双重依赖下分包商横向公平偏好对公共部门契约设计和期望收益的影响,构建基于公平偏好的单委托人–双代理人的模型.求解发现,随机依赖和分包商公平偏好对间接激励系数具有相反的影响,孰强孰弱影响了最优合同类型;而调整后的奖励分配更偏袒公平偏好较强的一方,导致其获得团队绩效合同的优势逐渐明显;公共部门针对分包商公平偏好进行的激励调整可以使自己获益,但不能忽视分包商的相对贡献,否则激励效果适得其反.因此,公共部门若想从激励强度调整中获益必须协调好双方的公平偏好与贡献大小.更多还原

【Abstract】 To clarify the impact of subcontractor’s horizontal fairness on the contract design and expected return of public sector under random dependence and technology dependence in the public goods technological innovation, this paper constructed a single-principal and dual-agents model based on fairness. The results show that random dependence and subcontractor’s fairness have opposite effects on the indirect incentive coefficient,which determines the optimal contract type. However, the adjusted reward distribution of the public sector favored the party with stronger fairness, which makes it the optimal choice to provide the subcontractor team performance contract. The public sector’s incentive adjustment for the fair preference of subcontractors can benefit itself, but the relative contribution of subcontractors cannot be ignored, otherwise the incentive adjustment is counterproductive. Therefore, if the public sector wants to benefit from the adjustment of incentive intensity, it must coordinate the fairness preference and contribution of both sides.更多还原