【摘要】 考虑保鲜努力水平和定价对社区门店和社区团购平台的影响，重点探讨定价、订货量、保鲜努力水平等决策问题。通过对比社区门店是否加入社区团购平台所获得的利润，为社区门店决策提供理论依据，探讨社区团购团（店）长与社区团购平台实现双合决策的可能性。研究发现（：1）当新鲜度敏感系数较大时，门店加入平台，采取低价、低保鲜、低订货量策略，以获得最大利润（。2）门店加入平台后，随着渠道价格竞争系数增加，门店与平台的最优决策均提高；渠道价格竞争系数较大时，门店加入平台后的最优商品售价和期望利润高于平台，但订货量相反（。3）门店加入平台后，佣金减少与进货折扣增加均会导致其最优利润减少。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the growth of the community group buying mode, a higher percentage of consumers prefer community group buying platforms to farmer’s markets when purchasing fresh products. With its "pre-sale +next-day delivery + self-pickup" business mode, community group buying platforms can satisfy the consumers’ increasingly stricter demand for product freshness. Nowadays, many community group buying group leaders under the community group buying mode work part-time as community store managers at the same time.Seeing that the willingness of these store managers to cooperate has become an important factor affecting the development of the platforms and stores, and the level of fresh-keeping effort and product pricing are key factors affecting the income of the community store managers as well, in this paper, considering the impact of fresh-keeping effort and pricing on a community store and a community group buying platform, we looked into the decision-making of the relevant parties on issues such as product pricing, order quantity, and level of fresh-keeping effort. Through numerical simulation, we compared the profits realized by the community store respectively when it joined the community group buying platform and when it did not to provide a decision-making basis for the community store, and explored the possibility of joint decision-making between the community group buying leader(store manager) and the community group buying platform. The research found that:(1) For maximized profit, when consumer freshness sensitivity coefficient is small, the community store should not join the community group buying platform and adopt the strategy of high price, high freshkeeping effort and high order quantity; when consumer freshness sensitivity coefficient is large, the community store should join the community group buying platform and adopt the strategy of low price, low fresh-keeping effort, and low order quantity;(2) After the community store joined the community group buying platform, with the increase of channel price competition coefficient, the optimal decisions of both the community store and the community group buying platform would increase. Given large channel competition coefficient,the optimal product selling price and expected profits of the community store after joining the community group buying platform would be higher than those of the community group buying platform, but the opposite is true for order quantity;(3) When the community store joined the community group buying platform, lower commissions and higher purchase discount would lead to lower optimal decision-making. The rise of the platform economy has provided a new sales channel for community stores and community group buying platforms, overcoming the obstacles of online and offline integration, and giving rise and momentum to the community economy. Community group buying leaders(store managers) and community group buying platforms can realize higher profits and also provide fresher products to consumers, thus creating more value than cost to the stores, platforms and consumers. Appropriate competition in the joint decision-making between the community group buying leaders(store managers) and community group buying platforms can stimulate the stores and platforms to make more rational decisions and obtain better performance. However, vicious competition would disrupt this steady upward spiral state.更多还原