【摘要】 保护债券投资者利益，是维护债券市场正常运行、更好发挥债券市场直接融资功能的根本保证。本文以“交叉违约条款”(也称“交叉保护条款”)的引入为研究场景，以2016-2021年发行债券的上市公司作为研究对象，探究了交叉违约条款对企业研发强度的影响。研究发现，设置交叉违约条款的企业显著降低了研发强度。原因在于交叉违约条款会提高企业的债务融资成本、缩短债务融资期限，降低企业的风险承担水平。并且，当企业面临的偿债压力更大、管理层能力更强时，交叉违约条款对研发强度的抑制作用将更加显著；而管理层的过度自信和短视程度、企业资金的可得性则会削弱上述影响。进一步分析显示，当交叉违约条款更易被触发时，企业研发强度受到的约束作用更强。同时，交叉违约条款主要减少了研发活动的费用化部分，促使企业更审慎地调整研发开支，体现为维持既有项目的研发进程、减少新项目的启动等。最后，交叉违约条款能够提高单位研发强度的专利产出质量。本文的研究对加强债券投资者保护制度构建、筑牢债券信用风险屏障具有重要启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 Protecting the interests of bond investors is the fundamental guarantee for maintaining the operation and better leveraging the direct financing function of the bond market. Using the listed companies that issued bonds from 2016 to 2021 as the research sample, we examine the impact of cross-default arrangement in 2016 on the corporate research and development(R&D) intensity. We find that companies with cross-default arrangement significantly reduce their R&D expenditure intensity because cross-default arrangement will increase the cost of debt financing, shorten the maturity of debt, while simultaneously reduce the level of risk-taking. When firms face greater debt repayment pressure and managers are more capable, the restrictive effect of cross-default arrangement on R&D intensity will be more significant; however, this impact will be mitigated by management’s overconfidence and myopia as well as the availability of corporate funds.Besides, corporate R&D intensity will decrease when the arrangement is more easily triggered; the cross-default arrangement primarily reduces the expensed portion of R&D expenditure and forces the issuer to adjust the allocation of R&D investment prudently, which is reflected in maintaining the process of existing projects and reducing the initiation of new projects. Finally, cross-default arrangement can improve the efficiency of corporate R&D. This research has important enlightenment for enhancing the bond investor protection arrangement as well as bond credit risk safeguards.更多还原