【摘要】 农村金融的可持续发展离不开涉农贷款的供给。但涉农贷款具有低收益和高风险并存的特征，防范和化解风险的同时又要激励银行持续支农，因而需要建立完善的风险补偿机制。本文立足于农村金融的供给侧，通过拓展利率定价中的价格领导模型，厘定可识别风险的贷款利率，提出了以此利率为基础的补偿数额测算方法，构建银行“内部收益补偿-外部收益补偿”“内部损失补偿-外部损失补偿”的四维量化分析框架，并以W农村商业银行为例做了具体测算。研究发现：（1）当前风险补偿以银行内部补偿为主，外部补偿力度不足；（2）银行外部补偿过少和内部补偿过多，会加剧其脱农离农倾向和贷款行业的持续分化；（3）相比损失补偿，银行对涉农贷款的收益补偿需求更多。据此，应以银行主要承担损失补偿和政府加大外部收益补偿为思路，进一步优化涉农贷款的补偿机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 The sustainable development of rural finance cannot be separated from the supply of agriculturerelated loans. However, agriculture-related loans have the coexisting characteristics of low return and high risk. While the government is preventing and resolving the risk, it also aims to incentive the bank to support agriculture continuously. Therefore, we need to establish a perfect risk compensation mechanism of agriculture-related loans. Based on the supply side of rural finance, this paper expands the Price Leadership Model in interest rate pricing, determines the loan interest rate of identifiable risk, proposes the measurement method of compensation amount based on this interest rate, constructs a four-dimensional quantitative analysis framework of bank’s "internal revenue compensation-external revenue compensation" and "internal loss compensation-external loss compensation", and makes specific measurements with the example of W Rural Commercial Bank. The study finds that:(1) The current amount of risk compensation is dominated by banks’ internal compensation, and external compensation is insufficient;(2) Too little external compensation and too much internal compensation by banks will cause them to aggravate the tendency to leave agriculture and the continued polarization of the lending industry;(3) Compared with loss compensation, banks have more demand for compensation for the revenue of agriculture-related loans. Therefore, the compensation mechanism for agriculture-related loans should be further optimized along the lines which banks should mainly compensate losses and government should increase external compensation for revenue.更多还原