【摘要】 中国式现代化进程中中国政府有多重目标，本文将多级政府和多目标决策纳入政府间财政关系研究，推导出政府间财政关系演进的三个理论命题：政府间财政关系主要取决于中央政府激励、平衡和控制三大目标的平衡；政府间财政关系受地方政府行动产出弹性、成本系数、外部性和不确定性等客观条件制约；中央和地方政府积极性发挥受政府间财政关系的影响，同时也与政府目标、政府行动产出弹性和成本有关。总体来说，政府间财政关系及效果取决于坚持中央统一领导和激发地方积极性之间的平衡。结合理论分析结果，本文详细解释中国政府间财政关系变迁的内在逻辑及其对不同历史时期现代化建设的影响。本文建立起了一个符合中国国情的、比较完整的中国政府间财政关系理论。更多还原

【Abstract】 Intergovernmental fiscal relations are pivotal in shaping a nation’s political and economic systems. When designing and adjusting these relations, the central government of China must maintain institutional unity and central authority while balancing three key considerations: accommodating regional differences, enabling various government levels to perform their functions, and achieving multiple political and economic objectives. Consequently, adjustments in these fiscal relations profoundly influence government behavior at all levels, shape government-market relations, and impact public goods provision, economic development, regional balance, and political stability.Extensive literature examines the characteristics of intergovernmental fiscal relations in China and their effects on government behavior and economic performance. However, most studies focus on specific aspects, lacking a systematic analysis or comprehensive theoretical explanation of the overall role of these relations. Indeed, China’s long history of central-local relationships, vast geographic and demographic context, ongoing practice since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and the governance strategy of “giving full play to the initiative of both the central and local authorities” provide a robust foundation for theoretical innovations. This enables a relatively systematic explanation of the role of intergovernmental fiscal relations in China.This paper begins by outlining the core characteristics of intergovernmental fiscal relations and incorporates multilevel government decision-making into the study, establishing a theoretical framework suited to China’s context. Using theoretical insights, the paper elucidates the inherent evolution logic of these relations, their impact on local government behavior, and their influence on economic growth during China’s modernization process. The main conclusions are as follows.First, theoretical research shows that the objectives of different government levels and external conditions determine intergovernmental fiscal relations over time, influencing government proactiveness.(1) The central government may increase local fiscal authority to promote economic development but reduce it to enhance leadership over local governments. The impact of the central government’s need to increase its fiscal revenue on these relations is uncertain.(2) These relations change with local government actions’ output elasticity, cost factors, uncertainty, externalities, and public welfare preferences.(3) Local fiscal authority, the objectives and preferences of different government levels, and the characteristics of governmental actions influence government proactiveness.Second, the paper uses theoretical conclusions to explain the logic behind changes in China’s intergovernmental fiscal relations and their impact on government proactiveness. When deciding fiscal relations, the central government engages in a multi-objective decision-making process, which involves increasing local fiscal authority to stimulate local government proactiveness. However, increased local proactiveness can lead to issues like diminished central authority,market segmentation, and weakened central macro-control. These issues create pressure for reforms in fiscal relations,which in turn deeply influence the behaviors of central and local governments, affecting economic growth, government financial capacity, and central-local power dynamics.Third, the paper explains why and under what conditions intergovernmental fiscal relations drive economic growth in China. These relations form an elastic sharing and allocation system where the rules for benefit distribution between different government levels and between the government and the market are adjustable based on participants’ goals, external conditions, and outcomes. This flexibility meets participation and incentive constraints, which is crucial for promoting economic growth.Based on these conclusions and against the backdrop of China entering a stage of high-quality development, the paper provides suggestions for future reforms in intergovernmental fiscal relations to continue leveraging their foundational role.更多还原