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授权与信息传递——未来收回决策权下的情形
Delegation and Communication under the Shadow of Future Reclaiming Authority
【摘要】 本文比较了未来收回决策权情形下授权和信息传递的优劣。研究采用了两期模型,第一期委托人决定是否授权,第二期委托人根据第一期获取的信息做出决策。Dessein(2002)的单期模型表明,只要存在有效信息传递,授权总是占优于信息传递的均衡。但在两期模型中,如果第二期委托人收回决策权,则第一期信息传递可能占优于完全分离均衡下的授权。此时,授权导致行动偏离最优点过高,使得授权不一定适宜。此外,折现因子越高,授权导致的偏离越大。
【Abstract】 We compare delegation versus communication under the shadow of future reclaiming authority. We consider a two-period model: the principal delegates or communicates in the first period and makes decision afterwards. In the static model, Dessein(2002) shows that whenever communication is informative, delegation will strictly dominate communication. While in our two-period model if the principal reclaim authority in the second period, delegation in the first period may be less desirable than communication. The delegation action turns out to be overbiased above both players’ bliss points, which renders delegation less desirable. Moreover, higher discount factor leads to more overbiased delegation.
- 【文献出处】 经济学(季刊) ,China Economic Quarterly , 编辑部邮箱 ,2024年04期
- 【分类号】F272.3
- 【下载频次】98