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多主体协同视角下乡村民宿监管的演化博弈

The Evolutionary Game of Rural Homestay Supervision from the Perspective of Multi-agent Coordination

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【作者】 夏赞才陈春修

【Author】 XIA Zancai;CHEN Chunxiu;

【机构】 湖南师范大学旅游学院

【摘要】 乡村民宿实现了乡村旅游产业与农业、林业、服务业等产业的融合发展,有效促进了乡村振兴战略的实施。在考虑游客对乡村民宿监管作用的基础上,构建乡村民宿经营者、游客和政府监管部门三个利益主体间的演化博弈模型并通过MATLAB进行仿真模拟,是促进乡村民宿高质量发展的重要途径。通过分析,得出的主要结论为:在采用游客反映机制后,政府可以降低对乡村民宿经营者的惩罚力度;演化博弈模型有四个稳定点,其中两种情形可以实现对乡村民宿的有效监管;政府奖惩力度,游客反映对民宿声誉影响程度的提升有助于促进民宿经营者经营优质民宿;政府提高对经营者和游客的奖励不利于政府自身履行监管职能。据此,提高乡村民宿业服务质量还需要在监管方式、游客补偿、民宿经营者奖励以及声誉评价等方面予以完善。

【Abstract】 Rural homestay has realized the integrated development of rural tourism industry, agriculture, forestry,service industry and other industries, and effectively promoted the implementation of rural revitalization strategy.On the basis of considering the regulatory role of tourists in rural homestays, it is an important way to promote the high-quality development of rural homestays to construct an evolutionary game model among the three stakeholders of rural homestay operators, tourists and government regulatory authorities and simulate it through MATLAB. Through analysis, the main conclusions are as follows : after adopting the tourist reflection mechanism,the government can reduce the punishment for rural homestay operators; the evolutionary game model has four stable points, two of which can achieve effective supervision of rural homestays; the government’s reward and punishment, and the improvement of the impact of tourists’ reflection on the reputation of the homestay will help promote the homestay operators to operate high-quality homestays; the government’s increase in incentives for operators and tourists is not conducive to the government’s own performance of regulatory functions. Accordingly,improving the service quality of the rural homestay industry also needs to be improved in terms of supervision methods, tourist compensation, rewards for homestay operators, and reputation evaluation.

【基金】 湖南省社会科学基金项目(18JD46);湖南省社会科学基金重大委托项目(19WTA11)
  • 【文献出处】 决策与信息 ,Decision & Information , 编辑部邮箱 ,2024年02期
  • 【分类号】F323;F592;F719.2
  • 【下载频次】96
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