【摘要】 尽管精确地评估薪酬监管政策对企业激励机制的影响具有重要的学术意义和政策价值，但囿于数据以及识别策略，当前研究还存在诸多争议和不足.本研究利用2015年初中央政府针对央企实施的《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》这一国家治理机制对高管薪酬构成的外生冲击，考察薪酬激励对央企风险承担行为产生的影响.研究发现相对于高管薪酬不受该改革方案影响的央企而言，受到影响的央企其风险承担水平显著降低；并且企业竞争程度越小、控制链层级越长、高管晋升预期越大，该薪酬改革方案对央企风险承担水平的负向影响越小，可见薪酬管制作为公司外部治理机制在一定程度上与这三个因素呈现替代关系.进一步研究发现，该改革方案还改变了央企的高风险投、融资行为.具体表现为债务融资率更低，创新投入规模更大但创新产出却更低.上述检验结果意味着与企业发展相适应的激励机制是提升央企风险承担水平的必要前提.因此，本研究有助于增进对央企高管薪酬契约的理解和认识，从而对推动和深化以高质量发展为目标的国企综合性改革具有重要的政策含义.更多还原

【Abstract】 Although accurately assessing the impact of compensation regulation policies on corporate incentive mechanisms has important academic significance and policy value, due to data limitations and identification strategies, there are still many controversies and deficiencies in current research. This paper utilizes the exogenous shock of the Compensation Reform Program to investigate the impact of compensation incentives on the risk-taking of central enterprises.The DID test based on the Compensation Reform Program in 2015 shows that the risk-taking level in the treatment group has significantly reduced after the policy compared with the control group. Additionally, the higher the promotion expectation of the executives, the smaller the degree of competition and the longer the control chain level, the less the negative impact.Further analyses reveal that the policy inhibits the high-risk investment and financing behavior. Specifically, the debt financing rate is lower; the innovation investment scale is larger, but the innovation output is lower. These results indicate that the effective incentive mechanism is the necessary condition to improve the risk-taking of central enterprises. Therefore, the research is helpful to deepen the dispute discussion of compensation system reform, and provide theoretical basis and policy reference for further promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises and improving the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.更多还原