【摘要】 对外直接投资中的代理问题研究逐渐兴起，但CEO职业顾虑对其影响作用存在争议。根据职业生涯理论，受职业顾虑等隐性契约激励影响，经理人倾向选择高风险投资，通过“干中学”提升能力。而基于安逸生活理论，职业顾虑使CEO规避高风险投资，减少负面的能力评价。因此，从CEO职业顾虑出发，检验公司对远涉重洋与安土重迁的偏好，挖掘跨国投资中代理问题的影响机理。利用2003年至2020年沪深A股上市公司数据，基于主成分分析法综合测度CEO职业顾虑，分别采用Probit模型和Probit-Poisson两步模型，实证检验CEO职业顾虑对公司对外直接投资进入决策和规模决定的影响。从风险承担和能力评价探究二者作用机制，重点关注国有与非国有公司差异，围绕对外直接投资动机、职业生涯、国际化进程等理论开展异质性分析，检验职业顾虑下信号传递效果和对外直接投资的逆向创新溢出效应。结果表明，CEO职业顾虑抑制对外直接投资进入、程度及广度等决策，即CEO职业顾虑较高公司倾向安土重迁。在考虑内生性、产权性质、盈余管理、进入决策增量、2008年金融危机、2018年中美贸易冲突等因素后，安逸生活假说依然成立。公司风险承担和能力评价是CEO职业顾虑影响公司对外直接投资的主要作用机制：较低风险承担能力、较高即期能力关注、较低历史能力评价等会加重CEO职业顾虑对公司安土重迁的影响。“一带一路”倡议实施、承接体制性产能过剩、非国有公司的汇率波动等市场寻求动机、国际化经验以及临近退休等，在不同程度缓解经理人追求安逸生活。安土重迁偏好迎合投资者对职业顾虑较高经理人能力评价的刻板印象，却损害公司盈余质量、国际化进程、创新投入与产出，阻断对外直接投资的逆向创新溢出效应。从安逸生活理论解读公司跨国投资中CEO职业顾虑所导致的不勤勉行为，有助于理解与治理公司跨国投资中的代理问题，为促进公司跨国投资、完善经理人考评与激励提供政策启示。更多还原

【Abstract】 Research on agency problems in OFDI is gradually emerging, but the role of CEO career concerns in influencing it remains controversial. According to career horizon theory, motivated by implicit contracts, such as career concerns, CEOs prefer risky investments, and seek to “learn by doing” to improve their abilities. Based on the quiet life theory, career concerns make CEOs avoid high-risk investments and obtain higher ability assessment by catering to the market. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the corporate preference for venturing far or settling down, and explore the mechanism of agency problems in multinational investment from the perspective of CEO career concerns.This study uses the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2020 to empirically test the influence of CEO career concerns on the entry and size decisions of OFDI based on the principal component analysis and Probit model and the two-step model of Probit-Poisson, respectively. The mechanism of CEOs′ career concerns affecting OFDI is explored from risk-taking and ability assessment, focusing on the differences between SOEs and nonSOEs. And heterogeneity analysis is carried out around the theories of OFDI motivations, career horizon, and internationalization process. This study examines the results of signaling and reverse innovation spillover effects of OFDI under career concerns.The study finds that CEO career concerns are negatively correlated with the entry decision, degree, and breadth of OFDI,suggesting that firms with higher CEO career concerns tend to settle down, which supports the quiet life theory. The quiet life hypothesis still holds after considering endogeneity, the nature of property rights, earnings management, incremental entry decisions, the financial crisis of 2008, and the China-US trade conflict in 2018. Further, corporate risk-taking and ability assessment are important mechanisms of how CEO career concerns influence cross-border investment. Weaker risk-taking ability,higher immediate ability concerns, and lower historical ability assessments can increase the impact of CEO career concerns on OFDI. Market-seeking incentives, such as the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, the burden of institutionalized overcapacity, exchange rate volatility in non-SOEs, internationalization experience and the proximity of retirement, inhibit managers from pursuing a quiet life. However, this preference for settling down caters to investors′ stereotypical impression of managerial ability assessment, which undermines the corporate earnings quality, internationalization process, and innovation inputs and outputs, and blocks the reverse innovation spillovers of OFDI.The research interprets non-diligent behaviors caused by CEO′s career concerns in corporate multinational investments from the quiet life theory, which helps understand and govern the agency problem in corporate multinational investments.Moreover, the findings provide some policy insights for promoting corporate multinational investments and optimizing managerial appraisal and incentives.更多还原