【摘要】 针对当前废旧光伏组件回收经济性偏低、主体责任不明、管理政策缺失等问题，为应对即将到来的组件“报废潮”，需要构建一个包含政府、组件制造商、光伏电站集成商、电站业主、回收处理商的三阶段主从博弈模型，探究生产者责任延伸制下固体废弃物税和奖惩机制对废旧光伏组件回收量及经济-环境-社会效益的影响，明确均衡状态下综合效益最优的税收与奖惩机制和主体定价策略。结果表明，两种政策联合实施比单独实施其中一项政策的激励效果更好，可以帮助制造商获得基于可节约成本的额外效益，并促使其采取提升回收商积极性的回收材料价格决策，从而增加回收量和效益。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on the current problems of low economy, unclear agent responsibility and lack of management policies for waste photovoltaic(PV) modules recycling in China, there is a need to construct a three-stage Stackelberg game model including the government, module manufacturers, PV plant integrators, power plant owners and recycling dealers, to cope with the upcoming “scrapping tide” of PV modules. By exploring the impact of the solid waste tax and premium-penalty mechanism on the recycling volume of waste PV modules and the economic, environmental, and social benefits under the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR) scheme, this paper clarifies the optimal mechanisms of tax and premium-penalty and pricing strategy of agents for comprehensive benefits under the equilibrium state. The results show that implementation of the two policies provides better incentive effects than either policy alone, which can help manufacturers to obtain additional benefits based on the cost they can save and to adopt better pricing decision of recycled materials that can enhance recyclers’ motivation, so as to increase the recycling volume and benefits.更多还原