【摘要】 基于盈余管理的视角，将中国地方政府工作报告作为政绩信息的载体，研究地方官员政绩信息对企业会计信息质量的影响。研究发现，地方官员政绩信息关注能够显著降低企业的盈余管理水平；外部关注强度、内部治理水平和企业融资能力的提高，是地方官员政绩信息关注减少企业盈余管理行为的理论机制。异质性分析发现，针对非国有、行业竞争激烈、市场化程度较高和经济增长目标约束较弱地区的企业，地方官员政绩信息关注能够发挥更强的边际作用。进一步研究发现，地方官员政绩信息关注在行业层面具有溢出效应，能够降低与被提及公司同行业企业的盈余管理水平。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of enterprise earnings management, this study takes the government work report of Chinese mainland prefecture-level cities as the carrier of performance information, and explores the external effect of local officials’ performance information on the quality of accounting information. It is found that the attention of local officials’ performance information can significantly reduce the earnings management level of enterprises mentioned by performance information. The intensity of external attention, the level of internal governance, and the improvement of borrowing capacity are the theoretical mechanisms for the reduction effect of local officials’ attention on corporate earnings management behavior. The results of heterogeneity analysis show that for enterprises in non-state-owned, fierce industry competition, high degree of marketization, and weak economic growth target constraints, the attention of local officials’ performance information has a stronger marginal effect on reducing the level of earnings management of enterprises. Further research shows that the concern of local officials’ performance information has a spillover effect at the industry level, which can reduce the earnings management level of enterprises in the same industry as the mentioned companies.更多还原