【摘要】 随着我国金融市场的快速发展，影子银行所带来的问题受到重大关注，非金融企业“脱实向虚”的趋势导致了近年来实体经济的下滑。作为资管行业的首个统一监管政策，资管新规致力于有效化解中国影子银行风险，高金融化实体企业因此受到严重冲击。以2016—2019年沪深A股非金融非房地产企业为研究对象，通过构建广义双重差分模型，分析资管新规实施这一准自然实验对实体企业在创新投入方面的影响。研究结果显示，资管新规主要通过提高债务融资成本和管理层风险预期这两个渠道抑制高金融化企业的创新投入水平。进一步研究发现，资管新规对非国有企业和管理层有金融背景的金融化企业影响更为显著。研究结果提供了资管新规对实体经济影响的微观经验证据，启发政策制定者在抑制企业脱实向虚时也需要为企业创新能力的提高提供激励。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid development of Chinese financial market, the challenges stemming from shadow banking have attracted great attention. In recent years, the trend of non-financial enterprises shifting from real to virtual economy has contributed to a decline in the real economy. As the first unified regulatory policy in the capital management industry, the New Capital Management Regulation aims to effectively mitigate the risks associated with shadow banking. Consequently,highly financialized entities have suffered severe impacts. Based on the data of A-share non-financial and non-real estate enterprises from 2016 to 2019, this paper empirically examines the influence of new capital management regulation on corporate innovation investment by constructing a generalized Difference-in-Difference model. The research reveals that the new capital management regulation mainly inhibits the innovation investment of highly financialized enterprises by raising debt financing costs and management risk expectations. Further research indicates that the new capital management regulation has a more significant impact on non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises whose management with financial background. The research provides micro-empirical evidence of the impact of the new capital management regulation on the real economy, and inspires policy makers to provide incentives for enterprises to improve their innovation capabilities while restraining their financializationmotives.更多还原