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国有股权参股与小微企业融资约束——基于制度逻辑与效率逻辑的双重视角
State-owned Equity Participation and the Financing Constraints of Micro and Small Enterprises(MSEs)——A Dual Perspective Based on Institutional and Efficiency Logics
【摘要】 基于制度逻辑与效率逻辑,本文使用CMES数据实证研究国有股权参股对缓解小微企业融资约束的作用机制。研究发现,政府股权介入增强了政企利益的关联程度,有助于小微企业降低代理成本和信息不对称,并获得资源保障,而小微企业较少受到双重代理问题的影响,通过与政府建立股权联系可以更有效地将信贷资源投入转化为投资项目产出,具有更显著的制度收益效应。因此,国有股权参股是缓解小微企业融资约束的有效政策工具。
【Abstract】 Based on institutional and efficiency logics, using data from CMES, this paper investigated the action mechanism of state-owned equity participation on the financing constraints of MSEs. It is found that government equity involvement enhances the degree of interest association between government and enterprise, which helps MSEs reduce agency costs and information asymmetries and have access to guaranteed resources, while MSEs are less subject to dual agency problems, by establishing equity connection with the government, MSEs can convert credit resource inputs into investment project outputs more effectively, which has much more significant institutional return effects. Therefore, state-owned equity participation is an effective policy tool to alleviate the financing constraints of MSEs.
【Key words】 MSEs; financing constraints; state-owned equity; resource effects; cross-sectional data;
- 【文献出处】 商业研究 ,Commercial Research , 编辑部邮箱 ,2024年01期
- 【分类号】F276.3;F275
- 【下载频次】116