【摘要】 考虑由制造商、大小型零售商和消费者组成的三级供应链，制造商通过大型零售商订单推断出市场需求状态并决策是否进行渠道入侵及信息泄露，由此构建制造商与零售商的四种博弈模型，研究制造商最优策略选择及对供应链成员利润的影响。研究发现，制造商是否直销渠道入侵与销售成本大小和产品市场需求状态有关，制造商是否泄露信息与其是否直销渠道入侵和高市场先验概率有关；大型零售商订单量均值会影响制造商信息泄露决策；制造商信息泄露对小型零售商并不总是有利的。更多还原

【Abstract】 The study considers a three-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a large and a small retailer, and a customer, where the manufacturer infers the market demand state from the large retailer’s orders and decides whether to invade channel and leak information, and constructs four game models between the manufacturer and the retailer to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal strategy choice and the impact on the profit of the supply chain members. It is found that whether a manufacturer invades or not is related to the size of sales cost and the state of product market demand; whether a manufacturer leaks information is related to whether it invades through direct sales channels and the high prior market probability; the average value of large retailer orders affects the manufacturer’s decision to leak information; and a manufacturer’s information leak is not always beneficial to the small retailer.更多还原