节点文献

基于演化博弈的应急物资政企协议储备决策研究

Research on Reserve Decision-making of Emergency Supplies Agreement Between Government and Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 徐超毅谷存

【Author】 XU Chao-yi;GU Cun;Anhui University of Science and Technology;

【机构】 安徽理工大学

【摘要】 为了解决灾前应急物资协同储备模式的决策问题,构建基于演化博弈理论的政企协议储备应急物资的博弈模型,分析影响政府和企业策略选择的因素,用MATLAB软件对算例进行敏感度分析。研究表明,物资代储量、代储补贴、物资价格等因素影响政府和企业的协议储备策略。研究结果可为政府优化应急物资储备结构和激励机制,以及鼓励企业参与协议储备,提供新的思路和方法。

【Abstract】 In order to solve the decision-making problem of the cooperative reserve mode for emergency supplies before disasters, a game model of government-enterprise agreement reserve emergency supplies based on evolutionary game theory was constructed, the factors that affect the strategic choices of government and enterprise were analyzed, and the sensitivity analysis of the case was conducted by using MATLAB software. The results indicate that factors such as supplies reserves, storage subsidies, and prices affect the agreed reserve strategies of governments and enterprises. The research results can provide new ideas and methods for the government to make decisions or optimize the structure of emergency supplies reserves and encourage enterprises to cooperate in reserves.

  • 【文献出处】 浙江交通职业技术学院学报 ,Journal of Zhejiang Institute of Communications , 编辑部邮箱 ,2023年04期
  • 【分类号】D63;F259.21
  • 【下载频次】28
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络